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Abstract 
This thesis bears two aims, namely systematic exposition and critical evaluation 
of Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity in his later writings. 
I would firstly locate Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity in his project of 
revaluation. I would show that Nietzsche launches such a project as a 
countermovement to nihilism, which is brought forth by the death of God (i.e. the loss 
of absolute status of the Christian woiidview). Taken in this way, his criticism of 
Christianity is motivated by a cultural concern. 
I would then explain the method of genealogy. Genealogy becomes an evaluative 
method by showing us how a value system favors the flourishing of a certain type of 
people at the expense of others. This constitutes Nietzsche's main criticism of 
Christianity. With a genealogy of Christianity, Nietzsche wants to show us how 
Christianity favors the flourishing of slavish type of people and hampers the 
development of the overman through its nihilistic effects. 
In the last of part of the thesis, I would defend Nietzsche's understanding of 
Christianity while have some reservations about his criticisms of the Christian ethics. 
Since I find that there are many difficulties in the theory of will to power as it is 
interpreted by Walter Kaufmann, which is probably the most popular interpretation 
today, the validity of his criticism of the Christian ethics remains problematic unless 
we can show how they can be freed from difficulties in will to power or have a better 
interpretation of that theory. 
I believe Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity is still meaningful despite some of 
its difficulties. I would conclude the thesis by showing what both Christian and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Why this topic? 
This thesis bears two aims, namely systematic exposition and critical 
evaluation of Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity. This topic is worth investigating 
for at least three reasons. 
Firstly, Christianity is arguably the most persistent theme in Nietzsche's writings. 
In his autobiography Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says 'Have I been under s tood?-
Dionysus versus the Crucified' ' (EH, IV §9). This statement pertinently summarizes 
Nietzsche's career as a critic of Christianity. Starting from his third book Human, 
All-Too-Human, Nietzsche begins his enterprise as a whole-hearted critic of 
Christianity^. The more mature his thought is, the more frequent and important the 
theme has become^. In his later years, the theme acquires such an important place 
that Nietzsche simply calls himself as 'the anti-Christ' and ‘the last disciple of 
Dionysus' (TI XI，§5), whose spirit is exactly the opposite to Christianity. Given 
such a prominent place in Nietzsche's writing, it would not go too far to say that it is 
necessary to understand Nietzsche's view about Christianity if we want to 
‘ T h e meaning and relation of Dionysus and the Crucified, which is born in the title of this thesis, 
requires lengthy explanation. See my discussion in Chapter 7. Let it suffice in the context to 
understand 'Dionysus' as a symbol of life-affirming worldview and the Crucified as a symbol of 
life-denying worldview. 
2 In fact, Nietzsche even says that Christianity is indirectly criticized in The Birth of Tragedy (EH III， 
§ 1) and ‘The Birth of Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values' (TI XI, §5). 
3 For an explanation of Nietzsche's changing relation with Christianity, see Thomas Brobjer 
'Nietzsche's Atheism', collected in Lippit and Urpeth (2000). 
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understand his philosophy. 
Secondly, Nietzsche's view on Christianity is actually a cultural criticism and is 
thus not merely of importance to religious people. As we will see, his analysis of 
‘the death of God' and the impending nihilism is a cultural diagnosis of the crisis of 
meaning brought by the Enlightenment. His reflection on the values (e.g. equality, 
altruism, pity) that Christianity treasures is at the same time a reflection on the basis 
of Western morality. His analysis and criticism of the ascetic ideal is of relevance to 
the appearance/reality dichotomy in the Western philosophy^. Thus, we would be 
fooled by the modern academic classification if we merely restrict the importance of 
Nietzsche's view on Christianity to the domain of religion. 
Finally, in spite of its emotional tone and harsh words, Nietzsche's criticism of 
Christianity deserves to be taken seriously even by the believer. It is because 
Nietzsche's way of criticism is consistent with the practice of Christianity. 
Following Paul Ricoeiir, Merold Westphal has recently characterized Nietzsche, 
together with Marx and Freud, as practicing the hermeneutics of suspicion regarding 
religion. What unites the three philosophers is the 'deliberate attempt to expose the 
self-deceptions involved in hiding our actual operative motives from ourselves, 
individually or collectively, in order not to notice how and how much our behavior 
This is why Nietzsche regards Plato as 'pre-existently Christian' (T1 XI §2). 
2 
and our beliefs are shaped by values we profess to d i sown�� . In other words, they 
urge us to reflect whether we have been using religion as a means for achieving our 
insidious purpose with professedly divine power and sanction. This kind of 
reflection is consistent with the Christian tradition, such as Jesus' critique of the 
Pharisees, Paul's critique of works righteousness and Jame's critique of cheap grace. 
Thus, Nietzsche's critique of Christianity could have some uses even for religious 
purpose. 
1.2 The Scope of this thesis 
In order to keep my thesis within a manageable scope, some delineations are 
required. I will make the delineation in two ways. 
A. The Aspects of Christianity 
Too many things could be denoted by the word 'Christianity'. But the main 
target that Nietzsche aims at and this thesis will focus on is the moral and religious 
teaching contained in the New Testament, especially in the four Gospels and Paul's 
letters. Let me explain. 
No one would dispute that the Bible is the most essential document of the 
position and teaching of Christianity. Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity is 
5 Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modem Atheism (Fordham 
University Press, 1988), p. 13. The term 'hermeneutics of suspicion' is coined and used by Paul 
Ricoeur in his Freud and Philosophy, Chapter 2 (Yale University Press, 1970). 
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naturally based on his reading of the Bible. 
In the Bible, Nietzsche holds a different attitude towards the Old Testament and 
the New Testament. He says the Old Testament is 'the book of divine justice' and 
contains 'human being, things and speeches' in a grand style while the New 
Testament 'contains a lot of the real, tender, musty true-believer and small-soul 
smell，. And he thinks that it is ‘the greatest audacity and sin against the spirit' to 
combine the Old and New Testament into a single book (BGE, §52). Therefore, his 
criticism of Christianity is mainly directed to the New Testament. 
In the New Testament, the four Gospels and in Paul's letters are particularly 
repugnant to Nietzsche. This can be shown by that he often cites the passages from 
these books as evidence of the position that he opposes. In the Anti-Christ, he even 
makes lengthy criticism of the four Gospels and Paul^. 
In the New Testament generally and the Gospels and Paul's letters particularly, 
what are particularly repugnant to Nietzsche are its moral rules and the religious 
doctrines which are used to justify these rules. Under the modern prejudice, 
morality seems to be completely separable from religion. While this may be true for 
some moral theories (e.g. Utilitarianism), it is surely not the case in the Christian 
ethics where the moral side (i.e. the moral rules of Christian ethics) and the religious 
6 See, A §39-45. 
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side (i.e. the religious beliefs) are intimately connected. Consider the structure of the 
Christian ethics. At the center of it, there are moral rules (e.g. the Ten 
Commandments) which stipulate what kinds of behavior are acceptable and what 
kind of behavior are disapproved. This is the level of normative ethics. However, 
every moral theory has to answer the meta-ethical question 'why should I be moral'. 
This is about the justification of and motivation for following the moral rules. And it 
is at this point that the religious side of Christian ethics intervenes. On the one hand, 
the religious doctrine offers an understanding of human nature (e.g. the original sin). 
On the other hand, it provides the ideals for human being to strive for (e.g. the 
salvation). Under these religious backgrounds, the justification of the moral rule 
would be that they enable us to transform from the original human nature to the 
ideal one. Taken away the religious side of Christian ethics, you will leave the moral 
precepts pointless. Since the religious doctrines of Christianity provide the 
necessary background under which its ethics becomes intelligible, they are both 
Nietzsche's targets of criticism.? 
B. Nietzsche's writings 
As I have said, Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity almost runs through the 
7 I realize the connection between Christian morality and its religious beliefs through the reading of 
Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virtue, 2"d edition, (Norte Dame, 1984). 
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entire corpus of his writings. Instead of considering the criticism in all these 
writings, I would only focus on four books of his later writings, namely Beyond 
Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, The Twilight of Idols and The 
Anti-Christ^. These four books are chosen for two reasons. 
Firstly, these four books constitute a coherent whole of later and mature 
Nietzsche's view of Christianity. It is so not only because the four books are written 
in Nietzsche's last productive years, but also that they are written in a rather short 
period of time (i.e. from 1886 to 1888). It is well known that Nietzsche changes his 
view very often on one topic. A wide selection of Nietzsche's writings would incur 
the danger of blurring the differences of Nietzsche's view of Christianity in different 
periods of his life. Since the four books are written in a rather short period of time, it 
is safe to infer that the change of view is less drastic and they form a more coherent 
whole. 
Secondly, the selection of the four books accords with Nietzsche's own 
division of his writings. As I will argue in Chapter 2, Nietzsche treats his criticism 
of Christianity as an important part of the project of revaluation. And in Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche regards the year after 1886 as the time for ‘the no-saying' and ‘the 
8 I am saying that I will concentrate on these four books for his criticism of Christianity. This should 
not preclude me from drawing the relevant passage from other books when dealing with other topics. 
As in explaining the topic of 'the death of God' and 'nihilism', many relevant passages can only be 
found in GS and WP. 
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revaluation of values' and considers Beyond Good and Evil as the dividing line of 
his works: ‘The task for the years that followed now was indicated as clearly as 
possible. After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come 
for the No-saying, No-doing part: The revaluation of our values so far, the great 
war- conjuring up a day of decision' (EH, 111:7). If we follow Nietzsche's intension, 
my selection of the four books is justified. 
1.3 The Structure of This Thesis 
This thesis will proceed to treat Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity as follow. 
Chapter 2 would point out Nietzsche's motivation of criticizing Christianity. I would 
locate his criticism in the context of his project of revaluation and explain the 
urgency for this project. 
Chapter 3 would investigate the actual fulfillment and the method of his project 
of revaluation. I would argue that the four books starting from Beyond Good and 
Evil are the actual fulfillment of the project of revaluation. I would also explain in 
what way genealogy can be a method of revaluation without committing the genetic 
fallacy. 
Since Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity is rooted on his special 
understanding of it, Chapter 4 will expose his genealogical study of Christianity. I 
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would divide Christian ethics into a kind of moral rules and virtues and also the 
religious underpinnings (i.e. guilt and ascetic ideal) which are used to justify the 
former. With this scheme of division, I would proceed to investigate Nietzsche's 
understanding of their origins. 
Chapter 5 will spell out Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity. I would put 
special emphasis on the nihilistic effects of Christianity since, in my interpretation, 
Nietzsche's main objective is to end the tyranny of Christianity and thereby pave the 
way for the overman. 
Chapter 6 is an evaluation of both Nietzsche's understanding and criticism of 
Christianity. Generally speaking, I am more skeptical on his criticism of Christianity 
because I find many difficulties in his theory of will to power. 
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Chapter 2 Christianity and Nihilism 
In Nietzsche's philosophy, Christianity is closely related to nihilism. On the 
one hand, he thinks that the death of God (or the decline of faith in the Christian 
God) gives rise to nihilism. On the other hand, he thinks that Christianity is a 
nihilistic religion. But these two claims cannot be true at the same time because they 
are contradicting. If the decline of faith in the Christian God leads to nihilism, there 
must be something in it which counteracts nihilism. If Christianity is a nihilistic 
religion, the decline of it should bring forth a liberation, rather than nihilism. How 
can Nietzsche hold these two claims at the same time? 
Reconciling these contradicting claims amounts to explaining what Nietzsche 
means by nihilism, the project of revaluation of the highest values and their 
relationship. When Nietzsche says the death of God leads to the advent of nihilism, 
he is saying that the collapse of Christian interpretation of the world, which is 
regarded as the only true interpretation, will make us feel the world and human life 
as meaningless. Nihilism in this sense means the loss of goal and meaning of the 
world and human life. For Nietzsche, nihilism is by no means unconquerable. Thus, 
he decides to launch a revaluation of the highest values. It is a project which 
involves two parts: (1) the determination of the value of values which has hitherto 
been conceived as the highest and supreme all over again, and (2) the establishment 
9 
of a new scheme of values. It is in the context of (1) that Nietzsche says Christianity 
is nihilistic. Here, being 'nihilistic' roughly means making the strong weak and the 
healthy sick. Since the two uses of nihilism are different in meaning, they are not 
contradictory. 
This sketchy answer brings out many important questions, namely the meaning 
of ‘God is dead' and its relation to nihilism on the one hand and the project of 
revaluation on the other. This chapter attempts to answer these questions in detail. 
2.1. The Death of God and Nihilism 
A. The Meaning of ‘God is dead， 
Nietzsche is probably best known for his saying 'God is dead'. The meaning of 
this slogan and the ground for it are by no means clear. However, there are two 
points that we can ascertain. First, this saying cannot be used to support the claim 
that Nietzsche is an atheist. For 'God is dead' to be sensible, God must once exist 
and live for a while. But an atheist makes the positive claim that there is no God. 
This position is thus different from Nietzsche's. Secondly, this saying does not 
imply that God exists either. It is because if the Christian God who is eternal and 
infinite does exist, He will never die by his very nature. Thus Nietzsche's saying 
cannot be taken literally and we must turn to the original text to find out its 
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meaning. 
Nietzsche proclaims ‘God is dead' in Gay Science section 125 through the 
mouth of a madman^. The madman runs into a market place and tells the people 
who do not believe in God, 'Whither is God? I will tell you. We have killed him -
you and 1. All of us are his murderers'. His listeners do not understand what he is 
saying. So the madman falls silent and goes away. Then, he says, 'I have come too 
early. My time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; 
it has not yet reached the ears of men' (GS, §125). 
This passage, though famous, is not very informative. It conveys only two 
things. First, it is M'e who kill the God. But it tells us neither in what sense the God 
is dead nor how we have killed Him. Second, the tremendous event of the death of 
God has not reached the ears of the mass. This explains why the man who 
announces the death of God is called 'madman'. The madman sees a fact of distant 
future while the mass does not. What the madman says is unintelligible to them. 
Hence, in the eyes of the mass, the madman is mad because he is talking nonsense. 
A more illuminating passage would be section 343: 'The greatest recent 
event - that “God is dead", that the belief in the Christian God has become 
unbelievable- is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe'. Here, 
9 'God is dead' first appears in GS section 108，where Nietzsche proclaims his new struggles, i.e. to 
vanquish the shadow of God in the cave after 'God is dead'. But this passage hardly tells us the 
meaning of the saying. 
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Nietzsche clearly indicates that 'God is dead' means 'the belief in the Christian God 
has become unbelievable'. However, ‘the death of God' must be richer in meaning 
and have more important implications. Otherwise, as skepticism regarding religious 
belief is not unpopular even in the past, we cannot explain why Nietzsche thinks this 
event is so tremendous. So, Nietzsche continues: 
But in the main one may say: the event itself is far too great, too distant, 
too remote from the multitude's capacity for comprehension even for the 
tidings of it to be thought of as having arrived as yet. Much less may one 
suppose that many people know as yet what this event really means- and 
how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because 
it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it\ for example, 
the whole of our European morality. (GS §343; emphasis added) 
As Walter Kaufmann says, by proclaiming ‘God is dead', Nietzsche is actually 
performing 'a diagnosis of contemporary civilization''^. Though Kaufmann says 
nothing about what this diagnosis amounts to, I think he points to the right direction. 
Ill my view, Nietzsche wants to show us that the Christian worldview (or what 
Nietzsche calls the Christian-moral interpretation of the world) ‘ ‘ has collapsed and 
this fact is symbolized by the saying 'God is dead'. Here, the 'collapse' of the 
Christian worldview, which is Nietzsche's own expression, could mean many things. 
I would rather interpret it as a moderate claim: the role of reason has been so 
Kaufmann (1974) p. 100. 
丨丨 Nietzsche uses this expression in his notes, which is then recollected in WP. I will use these two 
expressions interchangeably. I will explore the specific content of Christian worldview in Chapter 4. 
For present purpose, it is enough to understand it as the typical Christian beliefs, such as the original 
sin, salvation by Jesus Christ, the last judgment etc. 
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prominent in the modern age that the absolute character of the Christian worldview 
has been lost and do not play the dominant role it used to play in the past. This does 
not in any way imply that no one would believe in Christianity in the modern world. 
It just says that the Christian interpretation of the world has lost its absolute status. 
That the Christian worldview is still convincing to some is just due to the fact that 
they have chosen to believe in the first place and there is no compelling reason to 
adopt the believing attitude. 
The claim 'death of God’ is borne out by the Enlightenment'^, which occurred 
around the 1680s to the 1790s. Although the Enlightenment is a complex 
intellectual movement, it is united by the theme of re-building a worldview based on 
human reason. Its spirit is best captured by Immanuel Kant, who urges us to 'release 
from self-incurred tutelage' and to have courage to make public use of one's reason 
at every p o i n t ' I n other words, Kant urges us, as a world citizen, to use our reason 
freely, independent of external influence and put everything, especially religious 
dogmas, under the scrutiny of reason. This does not necessarily put us in opposition 
to traditional worldview. Some of the contents and values of traditional worldview 
(e.g. the content of morality) may be preserved, as Kant did in his moral 
This does not mean the Enlightenment is totally immune to the influence of Christianity. In 
Nietzsche's view, many Christian presuppositions and values are preserved in disguised forms in 
philosophy and science. See my later discussion of the shadow of God. 
13 See ‘What is Enlightenment', in Kramnickk (1995). 
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philosophyi4. But these preserved contents and values must be grounded on human 
reason, rather than on religious authority. 
Kant's characterization of the Enlightenment matches perfectly with 
Nietzsche's proclamation ‘God is dead'. To see this, we have to see how we have 
killed the God. Section 343 tells us that we do so by disbelieving the Christian God. 
This disbelieving attitude originates from the courage to have independent thinking, 
to explore knowledge. In comparing the modern spirit with the ancient, Nietzsche 
says: 
During the longest and most remote periods of the human past, the sting 
of conscience was not at all what it is now. Today one feels responsible 
only for one's will and actions and one finds one's pride in oneself.. 
during the longest period of the human past nothing was more terrible 
than to feel that one stood by oneself. To be alone, to experience things 
by oneself, neither to obey nor to rule, to be an individual- that was not a 
pleasure but a punishment; one was sentenced "to individuality" (GS 
§117; emphasis added). 
Since the courage for independent thinking and discovery of truth is so 
prominent that it almost amounts to the taste of modem times, Nietzsche says, 'what 
is now decisive against Christianity is our taste, no longer our reasons' (GS §132). 
Paradoxically, the taste is rooted in the Christian ethics. The Christian ethics 
cultivates a sense of truthfulness which eventually turns against the belief in the 
14 As Kaufmann says, Kant did not question the content of Christian morality and its universal and 
categorical character of morality. What Kant asks is just how is categorical imperative possible. This 
is one of the reasons why Nietzsche criticizes Kant so often. See Kaufmann, ibid. Chapters 2 & 3. 
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Christian God: 
You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god: 
Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was understood 
ever more rigorously, the father confessor's refinement of the Christian 
conscience, translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into 
intellectual cleanliness at any price. Looking at nature as if it were proof 
of the goodness and governance of a god; interpreting history in honor 
of some divine reason, as a continual testimony of a moral world order 
and ultimate moral purposes; interpreting one's own experiences as 
pious people have long enough interpreted theirs, as if everything were 
providential, a hint, designed and ordained for the sake of the salvation 
of the soul - that is all over now, that has man's conscience against it, 
that is considered indecent and dishonest by every more refined 
conscience -mendacionsness, feminism, weakness, and cowardice.... 
(GS, §357; emphasis added) 
Before ending this section, we will have to consider one more question. So far 
we have interpreted 'the dead of God' as the loss of absolute character of the 
Christian worldview. However, this interpretation seems to encounter some 
difficulties. In addition to the proclamation that 'God is dead', Nietzsche also says 
'given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his 
shadow will be shown. -And we- we still have to vanquish his shadow'(GS §108). 
What does the shadow of God stand for? And what does it mean to vanquish the 
shadow of God? If the shadow of God will persist 'for thousands of years' after God 
has died, why shouldn't we say that the God is just dying, but not dead? 
By ‘the shadow of God，，Nietzsche is making an observation that the Christian 
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worldview and value system are preserved in various disguised forms in our 
thinking. In Gay Science, Nietzsche lists the following example, which is explicitly 
referred to as the shadow of God: 
Let us beware of attributing it [the universe] heartlessness and unreason 
or their opposites: it is neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it 
wish to become any these things; it does not by any means strive to 
imitate man. None of our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to it. Nor 
does it have any instinct for self-preservation or any other instinct; and it 
does not observe any laws either... When will all these shadows of God 
cease to darken our minds? When will we complete our de-deification of 
nature? When may we begin to "naturalize humanity" in terms of a pure, 
newly discovered, newly redeemed nature? (GS §109; emphasis added) 
And here is another example: 
Man has been educated by his errors. First, he always saw himself only 
incompletely; second, he endowed himself with fictitious attributes; 
third, he placed himself in a false order of rank in relation to animals and 
nature; fourth he invented ever new tables of goods and always accepted 
them for a time as eternal and unconditional... (GS §115) 
That these presuppositions of Christianity still linger on our thinking is due to 
the reason that we are not courageous, consistent and honest enough in making 
changes and examining their validity. This is why Nietzsche emphasizes that in 
pursuing truth we must push ourselves to the point of harshness and that the virtue 
of intellectual conscience is the youngest virtue. 
By using the metaphor of a shadow hanging in the cave, Nietzsche is probably 
alluding to Plato's myth of the cave. Nietzsche emphasizes that the death of God is a 
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distant fact of the future and can be perceived by those who have strong and subtle 
eyes. For those who are courageous and consistent enough for truth (i.e. the free 
spirit in Nietzsche's terminology), they see that the Christian worldview is 
unbelievable and dangerous. In their eyes, the layman is just taking the dead things 
to be alive, the false thing to be r i g h t ' F r o m their point of view, they must say 
'God is dead' despite they foresee that the shadow of God will linger for thousands 
of years. So interpreted, vanquishing the shadow of God means getting rid of the 
groundless and dangerous presuppositions of Christianity. 
B. Nihilism 
The collapse of Christian worldview would lead directly to nihilism. Nihilism 
means the sense of meaninglessness and aimlessness of our being. As Nietzsche 
says in The Will to Power, 'What does nihilism mean? That the highest values 
devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; "why?" finds no answer.' (WP, Book One, 
I，§2)16. 
Already in Gay Science, Nietzsche has expressed nihilism as the consequence 
of the death of God through the mouth of the madman: 
15 The case is like Plato's myth of the cave where the prisoner mistakes the shadows in the wall to be 
reality. 
16 This is a general meaning of nihilism. Nimrod Aloni has divided 'nihilism' into three aspects, 
namely the metaphysical, the epistemological and the ethical aspect. See Aloni (1991), Chapter 5. 
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What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither 
is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all sun? Are we 
not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? 
Is there still any up or down? Do we not fell the breath of empty space? 
Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we 
not need to light lanterns in the morning?... (GS §125). 
Here, Nietzsche is using the metaphor of 'unchaining the earth from the sun' to 
express the fading of the Christian worldview from the modern world. The 
consequence is that we are left in an empty space, lost our direction and criterion of 
'up or down'. And Nietzsche reinforces it by saying that the night is closing in on us. 
This is why the madman lights a lantern in the bright morning hours when he is 
coming to the market place. 
Nietzsche expresses the causal relationship between the collapse of the 
Christian worldview and the advent of nihilism more explicitly in The Will to 
Power'For instance, he says: 
Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all 
guests?...// is one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral one, that 
nihilism is rooted. (WP, Book I, § 1: 1; emphasis added) 
The end of Christianity - at the hands of its own morality (which cannot 
be replaced), which turns against the Christian God (the sense of 
truthfulness, developed highly be Christianity, is nauseated by the 
falseness and mendaciousness of all Christian interpretations of the world 
and of history; rebound from "God is truth “ to the fanatical faith "All is 
false ”； Buddhism of action- (WP, Book I, §1: 2; emphasis added) 
17 In writing this part, I have benefited a lot from Richard Schacht's essay 'Nietzsche and Nihilism', 
collected in Schacht (1995). 
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Skepticism regarding morality is what is decisive. The end of the moral 
interpretation of the world, which no longer has any sanction after it has 
tried to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism. "Everything lacks 
meanings" (the untenability of one interpretation of the world upon which 
a tremendous amount of energy has been lavished, awakens the suspicion 
that all interpretations of the world are false)... (WP, Book I, §1: 3; 
emphasis added) 
Extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme 
positions of the opposite kind. Thus the belief in the absolute immorality 
of nature, in aim- and meaninglessness, is the psychologically necessary 
affect once the belief in God and an essentially moral order becomes 
untenable. Nihilism appears at that point, not that the displeasure at 
existence has become greater than before but because one has come to 
mistrust any "meaning" in suffering, indeed in existence. One 
interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the 
interpretation it now seems as if there M>ere no meaning at all in existence, 
as if everything were in vain. (WP, Book I, §55; emphasis added) 
The above passages tell us that the collapse of the Christian worldview would 
lead to nihilism since it is conceived to be the only true interpretation and we have 
devoted tremendous amount of energy on it. With its collapse (i.e. the loss of 
absolute status), we feel that our value system is built upon a foundation which is 
questionable. Without the absolute security that is possible in the past, we suddenly 
have the sense of meaninglessness and aimlessness. 
One can certainly avoid drawing this conclusion. After all, our value system 
needs not be built upon an absolute and unquestionable foundation. We can admit 
both our value system and its foundation are open to error and amendment. But 
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Nietzsche tells us that extreme positions are by psychological necessity succeeded 
by other extreme positions of opposite kind. In my interpretation, the psychological 
necessity is about the human, all too human needs which impel us to come up with 
the extreme position in the first place. Nietzsche thinks that we endorse the 
Christian worldview in order to satisfy some psychological needs: 
What were the advantages of the Christian moral hypothesis? 
1. It granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and 
accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away. 
2. It served the advocates of God insofar as it conceded to the world, in 
spite of suffering and evil, the character of perfection- including 
"freedom": evil appeared full of meaning. 
3. It posited that man had a knowledge of absolute values and thus 
adequate knowledge precisely regarding what is most important. 
4. It prevented man from despising himself as man, from taking sides 
against life; from despairing of knowledge: it was a means of preservation. 
In sum: morality was the great antidote against practical and theoretical 
nihilism.'^ (WP Book I, §4) 
In order to satisfy this psychology needs, we invent various fictitious 
conception, such as 'God', ‘aim,，'unity', ‘being’，'true world' and others. In the 
past, the Christian worldview is considered to be absolute truth and we feel that our 
psychological needs are well satisfied. However, with the sense of truthfulness 
cultivated highly by Christian morality, we finally learn that 'aim', 'unity', 'being', 
'8 The last sentence may require explanation. 'Morality' in this sentence means the Christian 
worldview, which Nietzsche characterizes as 'the moral interpretation of the world. The relationship 
between Christian ethics and its religious worldview will be explained in Chapter 4. Taken in this 
way, the Christian worldview is ‘the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism' because 
it satisfies our needs. 
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'true world' and other elements in Christian worldview are nothing but human 
projection. And Nietzsche says, 'Briefly: the categories "aim", "unity", "being" 
which we used to project some value into the world - we pull out again; so the 
world looks valueless' (WP, Book I, §12A). 
The world looks valueless because it is not the ways that we think it should be 
and we cannot bear the world as it really is. That is to say, we cannot bear the facts 
that the world or becoming is without the preordained meaning and aim, without 
some supreme form of domination and administration (Nietzsche is referring to 
monism), and there is no true world in contrast with which this world is mere 
deception. Nietzsche then defines nihilism in psychological terms: 'nihilism, then, is 
the recognition of the long waste of strength, the agony of the "in vain", insecurity, 
the lack of any opportunity to recover and to regain composure - being ashamed in 
front of oneself, as if one had deceived oneself all too long' (WP, Book I, §12A). 
This explains why the loss of absolute character of the Christian worldview would 
lead to nihilism. 
2.2. Nihilism and the Project of Revaluation 
That the advent of nihilism is tied to the collapse of only one interpretation of 
the world also indicates that nihilism is by no means unconquerable. After all, it is 
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only one interpretation collapses and we can invent other interpretations. Indeed, 
Nietzsche thinks that nihilism (i.e. the sense of meaningless and aimless) involves 
'pathological generalization', the generalization from the collapse of one 
interpretation to the conclusion that there is no meaning at all, or in other words, the 
rebound from 'God is death' to 'all is false': 
Nihilism represents a pathological transitional stage (what is pathological 
is the tremendous generalization, the inference that there is no meaning at 
all): whether the productive force are not yet strong enough, or whether 
decadence still hesitates and has not invented its remedies... (WP§13; 
emphasis added) 
This passage is important because it indicates the ambiguity of nihilism. 
Nietzsche calls the generalization as 'pathological' because the nihilists (i.e. those 
who make the generalization) are so weak in their productive force that they cannot 
come up with new values and invent remedies for the temporary sense of 
meaningless. For Nietzsche, the death of God is ambiguous in meaning according to 
the strength of spiritual power: 
Nihilism. It is ambiguous: 
A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism 
B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive 
nihilism. (WP §22) 
19 Strictly speaking, nihilism cannot be ambiguous if it is interpreted as 'the highest values devalues 
themselves. The aim is lacking; "why?" finds no answer'. What is ambiguous is the collapse of 
Christian worldview, which is a dawn, an open sea for the strong and gloomy nihilism for the weak. 
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It can be a sign of strength: the spirit may have grown so strong that 
previous goals have become incommensurate... Or a sign of the lack of 
strength to posit for oneself, productively, a goal, a why, a faith. 
It reaches its maximum of relative strength as a violent force of 
destruction - as active nihilism. 
Its opposite: the weary nihilism that no longer attacks; ... a passive 
nihilism... (WP §23) 
To sum up, Nietzsche is saying that the death of God is ambiguous 
according to the strength of our spiritual power. For the weak, the collapse of 
one interpretation leaves them feel hopeless and meaningless. They cannot posit 
values by themselves and invent remedy for the situation. This is what 
Nietzsche calls the passive nihilism. In contrast, the collapse of Christian 
worldview could means the possibility of coming up more healthy and realistic 
worldview. This is why Nietzsche says 'nihilism could mean an increased 
power of spirit'. This naturally reminds us the opening passage of Book Five of 
Gay Science, which is entitled ‘We Fearless Ones': 
The meaning of our cheerfulness - ...Indeed, we philosophers and "free 
spirits" feel, when we hear the news that the "old god is dead", as if a new 
dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, 
premonitions, expectation...at long last the horizon appears free to us 
again...at long last our ships may venture out again...the sea, our sea, lies 
open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea". (GS 
§343) 
Seizing the new opportunity after the death of God and inventing new 
values are only one half of the meaning of the active nihilism. The other half is 
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that what Nietzsche calls ‘the destruction'. But what is to be destroyed? I think 
it is the value of Christianity, whose collapse causes nihilism in many people. 
Nietzsche's idea is that we have to trace the source of our faith in Christianity 
and determine its value. Once we have done this and discovered that 
Christianity is dangerous, its collapse will no longer be reasons for us to feel 
despair. This interpretation is borne out in Will to Power: 'Suppose we realize 
how the world may no longer be interpretation in terms of these three categories 
(i.e. preordained meaning and order, monism and true world), and that the world 
begins to become valueless for us after this insight: then we have to ask about 
the sources of our faith in these three categories...Once we have devaluated 
these three categories, the demonstration that they cannot be applied to the 
universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the universe' (WP §12B). 
Taken in this way, the two side of active nihilism (i.e. coming up with new 
value and 'destruction') is very similar to his project of revaluation^^. And he 
says this project is a countermovement to nihilism both because it invents new 
value and determines the values of the Christianity: 
. . . " T h e Will to Power: Attempt at Revaluation of All Values"- in 
this formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both 
principle and task; a movement that in some future will take place of 
perfect nihilism- but, presupposes it, logically and psychologically, 
I would explain the project of revaluation more concretely in the next chapter. 
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and certainly can come only after and out of it...because we must 
experience nihilism before we can find out what values these 
"values" really had... (WP, Preface §4) 
This explains the connection between nihilism and the project of 
revaluation. The connection is that the latter is a countermovement of the 
former. 
However, I think there is another reason for the urgency of the project of 
revaluation. It is because the shadow of God (the presuppositions of Christian 
worldview) is still hanging on our thoughts. But no one before Nietzsche has 
thoroughly examined the value of Christianity. Nietzsche thinks that this is both 
inconsistent with the truthfulness cultivated by Christianity^' and dangerous. 
He says, ‘One has taken the values of these "values" as given, as factual, as 
beyond all question... But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of 
regression were inherent in the "good", likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, 
a narcotic through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the 
future?... ' (GM, Preface §6)^^. This is why Nietzsche feels that it is his 
missionary task to launch the project of revaluation and regards it as 
momentous. 
21 This is why Nietzsche emphasizes that he is drawing the logical consequence of Christianity by 
the project of revaluation. See WP, Preface §4. 
"“Another relevant passage is WP, Book One §4: 'Residues of Christian value judgment are found 
everywhere in socialistic and positivistic systems. A critique of Christian morality is still lacking'. 
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Chapter 3 The Project of Revaluation and the 
Method of Genealogy 
This chapter is devoted to solve two questions regarding the project of 
revaluation. The first one is about which books are to be counted as the actual 
fulfillment of this project. The problem is largely due to fact that Nietzsche changes 
his mind about the project too often in a rather short period of time (i.e. the year of 
1888, Nietzsche's last productive year). It leads some scholars (e.g. R. J. 
Hollingdale) to suspect that Nietzsche has actually abandoned the project. Solving 
this problem is important to my thesis because I have located Nietzsche's criticism 
of Christianity in the context of his project of revaluation. If such project is 
abandoned, it seems either that I have located his criticisms of Christianity in the 
wrong place or that I am pointless to recount his criticisms because, after all, he has 
abandoned it. I would tackle this question in section 3.1. 
The other question is about the methodology of revaluation. As I will argue, 
Nietzsche relies on the method of genealogy to carry out his project^^. Nevertheless, 
how the study of origin can help us to determine the value of values is far from clear. 
23 Nehamas holds that 'genealogy is simply history, correctly practiced', but not 'a discipline with 
independent rules and principles that determine the objects with which it is concerned'. See Nehamas 
(1985), P .246, n. l . See also Guess, 'Nietzsche and Genealogy', collected in Richardson (2001). 
This may seem to oppose to my position which treats genealogy as a method of revaluation. I 
guess there may be two levels of genealogy. I can agree with Nehamas only to the extent that 
genealogy, when worked out, is a historical narrative. However, Nietzsche has explicitly laid out 
what should be included in a genealogical narrative and the aim that it serves (See Section 3.2 for 
details). Though it is not 'method' in the strict sense, I think it is appropriate to refer to this level as a 
method for it offers a rough guideline on how to write a genealogical narrative. 
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The problem is even more acute because it seems that such method would commit 
us to the genetic fallacy, i.e. to determine the value or validity of one thing through 
its origin24. Therefore, any satisfactory explanation of genealogy should explain the 
relationship between origin and the value of values on the one hand and avoid the 
genetic fallacy on the other. Section 3.2 tries to provide such an account. 
3.1 The Fulfillment of Revaluation 
In the following part, I am going to argue that if we respect Nietzsche's 
intention, we should count the four books starting from Beyond Good and Evil as 
the actual fulfillment of such project. Since our aim is to find out Nietzsche's own 
view about such project, detailed historical account is in order. 
The years from 1886 to 1888 are important for our purpose. During these three 
years which are Nietzsche's most productive time, there are many resources that 
reveal Nietzsche's own view about the project of revaluation. I will divide the 
sources into two types, namely the published and the unpublished materials. The 
unpublished materials mainly consist of the materials in Nietzsche's notebook. And 
we will talk about it later in our discussion of H. J. Hollingdale's view. Among the 
published materials, we should pay attention to Nietzsche's prefaces to his 
24 Strictly speaking, genetic fallacy is 'the error of treating items in the context of discovery as if 
they belonged to the context of justification... It is the fallacy of considering factors in the discovery 
or genesis of a statement relevant, ipso facto, to the truth or falsity of it', see Salmon (1963), p.12. 
2 7 
published books during 1886 to 1888 and his autobiography Ecce Homo which is 
written in 1888. These materials reveal Nietzsche's own view about the significance 
of his works. 
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche regards the year after 1886 as the time for 'the 
no-saying' and 'the revaluation of values' and considers Beyond Good and Evil as 
the dividing line of his works: 'The task for the years that followed now was 
indicated as clearly as possible. After the Yes-saying part of my task had been 
solved, the turn had come for the No-saying, No-doing part: The revaluation of our 
values so far, the great war- conjuring up a day of decision' (EH, 111:7). 
This claim is made in 1888. It is not Nietzsche's sudden whim. Many prefaces 
of his works support this division of his work. The preface of On the Genealogy of 
Morals reads, ‘Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, 
the value of these values themselves must first be called in question - and for that 
there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, 
under which they evolved and changed' (GM, Preface §6). That is to say, the 
genealogical inquiry is to serve the purpose of determining the values of the moral 
va lues�� . This purpose is clearly synonymous with the meaning of 'revaluation'. 
In the preface of Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche tells us that 'this little essay 
25 The expression of'determining the value of moral values' is a bit clumsy. Roughly, it means 
determining the worth of the moral values. 
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is a great declaration of war; and regarding the sounding out of idols, this time they 
are not just idols of the age, but eternal idols, which are here touched with a hammer 
as with a turning fork.. . ' (TI, preface). Here, Nietzsche uses the expression 'eternal 
idol' instead of the highest values. The metaphor of a turning fork is probably used 
to convey the subversiveness of this book. He says, ‘If you want a quick idea how 
before me everything stood on its head, begin with this essay (i.e. Twilight of the 
IdolsY (EH III §9:1). And turning something right-side up is a pertinent image for 
the project of revaluation. It is because Nietzsche calls the formula for the project as 
‘the relentless and underground struggle against everything that human being till 
now revered and love'^^. 
The Anti-Christ is even more obviously a part of the project of revaluation. The 
preface of Twilight of the Idols dated ‘Turin, the September, 1888，on the day 
the first book of the Revaluation of All Values was completed'. Naturally, according 
to his planning , the first book of Revaluation must refer to The Anti-Christ which 
is finished in September 1888. 
My conclusion after the above account is that according to Nietzsche's 
intention, the four books (i.e. Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, 
Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ) are the actual fulfillment of the project of 
26 See Nietzsche's letter to Reinhart Von Seydlitz (February 12，1888), collected in SL p.283. 
27 See my later discussion of our common understanding of the four books of revaluation. 
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revaluation. 
This may seem a bold conclusion and contradict with our common 
understanding of Nietzsche. Our common understanding is that the revaluation 
consists of four books, namely The Anti-Christ, The Free Spirit, The Immoralist and 
Dionysus and that Nietzsche finished only the first book. However, our doubt may 
be released if we consider the following reasons. Firstly, bold as it may seem, my 
conclusion matches with the actual practice of many Nietzsche's scholars (e.g E. E. 
Sleinis and Daniel Conway)^^. When they write something about Nietzsche project 
of revaluation, they draw the relevant material mainly from the four books in my 
conclusion. 
A more important reason is that the expression 'the project of revaluation' is 
ambiguous in meaning. It could mean (1) a general task and (2) the writing a book 
called Revaluation of Values. The task of revaluation could, but need not, be 
fulfilled by writing a peculiar book called Revaluation of Values. It could be done in 
other ways. While my conclusion is that the four books are the actual fulfillment of 
the task of revaluation, our common understanding of Nietzsche's four books is 
about the layout of a book called Revaluation of All Values. More precisely, I am 
claiming that according to Nietzsche's own view, what he is doing in the four books 
See Sleinis, Nietzsche's Revaluation of Values (University of Illinois Press, 1994); Conway, 
Nietzsche Dangerous Game (Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 6. 
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starting form Beyond Good and Evil is revaluating of the highest values. Our 
common understanding is about the writing of a book called Revaluation of Values凶. 
It is true that Nietzsche never succeeds in writing such a book. But this does not 
contradict with my conclusion. 
This ambiguity leads some scholars to suspect that Nietzsche has abandoned 
the project. The most prominent representative is R. J. Hollingdale. However, if we 
keep the distinction in mind, many points in Hollingdale，s analysis which seem to 
contradict with my conclusion are only apparent. For example, he says that 
Nietzsche has abandoned the 'project' of revaluation because in some time between 
November 1888 to the early date of 1889, the manuscript of title pages preserved in 
the Nachlass has two different versions of subtitle of The Anti-Christ. The earlier 
one reads "The Anti-Christ: Attempt at a Critique of Christianity. Book One of the 
29 According to R. J. Hollingdale's analysis, Nietzsche has planned to write a book called The Will to 
Power for a thoroughly detailed account of his philosophy. In Nachlass, there are twenty-five plans 
for layout of the project. Nietzsche first mentions the writing of the book in Genealogy. Here, he says 
‘a work I have in preparation: The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values'. After the 
writing of Genealogy, he turns to write The Wagner Case and Twilight of the Idols. In the meanwhile, 
the planning of the project has changed. This time Nietzsche intends to write Revaluation of all 
Values, which consists of four short books. The layout for the book is: 
Book 1: The Anti-Christ: Attempt at a Critique of Christianity 
Book 2: The Free Spirit: Critique of Philosophy as a Nihilistic Movement 
Book 3: The Immoralist: Critique of the Most Fatal Kind of Ignorance, Morality 
Book 4: Dionysus: Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence 
See Hollingdale (1999), Chapter 14’ p. 218-219. 
3 1 
Revaluation of all Values'. The later reads "The Anti-Christ: Revaluation of all 
Values'. But the subtitle has been heavily crossed out, and underneath is written in 
large characters: ‘A Curse on Christianity'. What Hollingdale is saying is about the 
writing of a book called Revaluation of Values. Since my claim is about the task of 
revaluation, we do not contradict with each other. 
Quite to the contrary, Hollingdale's final conclusion supports my claim. He 
says 'Nietzsche has abandoned writing book about Revaluation' and this 
abandonment is ‘the effect of an underlying sanity which recognized that the 
Revaluation was no advance upon the philosophy completed in Zarathustra but only 
a commentary on it, and that this commentary itself had already been published in 
the series from Beyond Good and Evil to Twilight of the Idols'��. 
As the four books are the fulfillment of revaluation, I would focus on them for 
Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity. On this point, some may object that 
Nietzsche's earlier books should not be neglected, especially Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. One way to answer this objection is to defend Nietzsche's own division 
of his works. One would have to show the difference between the books before and 
those after Beyond Good and Evil. The burden of proof in this line of defend is 
See, Ibid, p.220. 
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conceivably quite enormous. Therefore, I would like to defend my selection in other 
ways. Firstly, the four books are written in Nietzsche's last two years of sanity and 
thus can represent his mature view on Christianity. Also, since these four books are 
written in a rather short period of time, change of mind is less drastic. Thus, the four 
books may form a more coherent whole of Nietzsche's mature thought. Lastly, the 
coherence of the four books can further be shown by the employment of the 
genealogical method. As I will show immediately, the discovery and employment of 
genealogical method is a breakthrough in Nietzsche's philosophy. In Beyond Good 
and Evil, he discovers that there is a correlation between a value system and the 
type of person who has invented and supported it. This is one of the basic these of 
genealogy. He works out this new discovery in details in On the Genealogy of 
Morals. From these two books onwards, the focus of the criticism of Christianity 
has shifted from showing the fallacy of its beliefs to its origin and harmfulness^^ 
3.2 The Method of Revaluation 
Nietzsche is very proud of his idea of that project. He believes it 'would split 
31 If the above two reasons are not enough to justify the omission of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I 
would draw reader attention to the fact that Nietzsche has said to his friend that 'Please read this 
book [i.e. BGE] (even though it says the same things as my Zarathustra- only in a way that is 
different -very different).' See Nietzsche's letter to Jakob Burckhardt (September 22, 1886), 
collected in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, edited and translated by Christopher Middleton. 
Hereafter, this book will be abbreviated as SL. 
I must admit that the literally form of Zarathustra makes it harder to understand. If Nietzsche is 
right that BGE and Z say the same thing in different forms, I would rather to concentrate on the 
former out of pragmatic consideration. 
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humanity into two halves'^^ and makes himself 'the first philosopher of the 
age...something decisive and doom-laden standing between two millennia，^〕. 
However, what exactly in the project of revaluation makes Nietzsche a destiny? 
In the last chapter of EH, which is entitled 'Why I Am a Destiny', he tells us that 
‘the uncovering of Christian morality is an event without parallel, a real catastrophe. 
He that is enlightened about that, is a force majeure, a destiny — he breaks the 
history of mankind in two. One lives before him, or one lives after him.' (EH IV,§8) 
That is to say, what makes Nietzsche a destiny is precisely that he has 
uncovered the Christian morality through the task of revaluation. Nevertheless, we 
have to press for more specificity on this point: what does 'uncovering of the 
Christian morality' mean? Nietzsche explains to us that to uncover the Christian 
morality is to seek the psychology under which the Christian valuation is made: 
'who before me climbed into the caverns from which the poisonous fumes of this 
type of ideal-slander of the world- are rising? ...Who among philosophers was a 
psychologist at all before me, and not rather the opposite, a "higher swindler" and 
"idealist"? There is no psychology at all before me.' (EH IV，§7) 
Furthermore, Nietzsche tells us that 'whoever uncovers morality also uncovers 
the disvalue of all values that are and have been believed...' (EH IV, §8). In other 
32 See T o Paul Deussen' (September 14, 1888), collected in SL. 
“ S e e ‘To Reinhart von Seydlitz (February 12, 1888)', collected in SL. 
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words, discovering the psychological origin of Christian morality helps us to 
determine its worth. 
Nietzsche's formulation of the task of revaluation gives us hints for his method 
of revaluation. The required method should be able to determine the value of 
Christianity by uncovering its psychological origin. To my knowledge, only the 
genealogical method could fulfill this requirement. In the preface of On the 
Genealogy of Morals’ where the most important and clear formulation of the 
genealogical method can be found, Nietzsche says, 
Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the 
value of these values themselves must first be called in question - and for 
that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in 
which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as a 
consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as 
misunderstanding; but also morality as a cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as 
restraint, as poison), a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or 
even been desired. (GM, Preface §6) 
This passage tells us that (1) the genealogical study aims at determining the 
values of moral values, (2) to achieve this, we need to know the conditions and 
circumstances in which moral values have grown, and finally (3) as the word 
'symptom' suggests, the condition out of which moral values grows is essentially 
connected to the type of person who has invented them. It seems that genealogy 
matches perfectly with the requirement of the project of revaluation. 
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That genealogy is the method of revaluation matches with the conclusion that I 
have arrived in section 3.1, namely revaluation consists of four books starting from 
Beyond Good and Evil. To see this point, we have to know the fundamental change 
in Nietzsche's way of criticizing morality. Although the focus of Nietzsche's 
criticism of Christianity has changed over his life, what remains constant is that 
these criticisms are very often raised through the investigation of the origin of 
Christianity. In his earlier writings, for instance, Nietzsche traces the origin of 
religious cult^ "^ and the doctrine of redemption]) to the need of explanation of 
natural phenomena and depression respectively. His main concern in these studies 
of origin is to show that the origin of Christianity involves intellectual errors and 
false presuppositions. He believes that we will not believe in Christianity any more 
once we know understand these errors^^. 
However, Nietzsche soon realizes the inadequacy of this way of criticism. One 
would not cease to be Christian simply by showing the fallacy of certain Christian 
beliefs. For he begins to recognize that one believes in a certain worldview and 
value system in order to fulfill one's psychological need. He explicitly states this 
HA, §111 'Origin of the Religious cult' 
35 HA, §132 ‘On the Christian Need of Redemption, 
36 For example, he says 'If we transport ourselves back to the ages in which the religious life 
flourished most vigorously we discover a fundamental conviction which we no longer share and on 
account of which we see the door to religious life once and for all closed to us: it concerns nature and 
our traffic with nature' (HA §111) and 'With the insight into this aberration of reason and 
imagination one ceases to be a Christian' (HA §132). 
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discovery in BGE, 'even apart from the value of such claims as "there is a 
categorical imperative in us", one can still always ask: what does such a claim tell 
us about the man who makes it? ... In short, moralities are also merely a sign 
language of the affects' (BGE, §187) and ‘the difference among men becomes 
manifest not only in the difference between their tablets of goods...it becomes 
manifest even more in what they take for really having and possessing something 
good. '(BGE, §193) 
With this discovery, he begins his discussion of slave morality in Beyond Good 
and Evil, which is continued in On the Genealogy of Morals. Compared with the 
former, Genealogy is more systematic, argumentative and profound. That 
Genealogy has such features is largely due to the employment of the genealogical 
method. 
The employment of genealogy is a breakthrough in Nietzsche's philosophy. 
With this tool in hand, Nietzsche starts to uncover the relation between value system 
and the type of person who has invented it. From now on, his criticism of 
Christianity concentrates on the origin and harmfulness of its values. Only with 
genealogy can Nietzsche characterize Christianity as 'religion of decadence' and 
‘nihilistic’ which constitutes the main theme of later Nietzsche's philosophy. 
The above analysis only shows that genealogy is the main method of 
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revaluation. But how does genealogy work? And how can the origin of something 
shed light on its value? We would now turn to these questions. 
A. The Concept of Genealogy 
Firstly, I will look into the method of genealogy itself. Genealogy is mainly a 
study of the origin of something. When applied to the realm of morality, genealogy 
indicates a naturalistic approach to morality. It implies that moral values are not 
divinely ordained, fixed and eternal, but are human invention and subject to change. 
Only because morality is a human invention is it sensible to investigate the 
conditions under which it is invented. The naturalistic character of genealogy is 
even more obvious when we see that, as I will explain later, this approach consists 
mainly of the psychological and the historical sides . Nietzsche seems to have in 
mind that our value system is firstly invented by person under particular 
psychological condition. Then this system is evolved and changed through historical 
course. The objective of genealogical study is to come back to the psychology of the 
type of person who has invented a particular value system with the aid of historical 
evidence. 
For the psychological side of genealogy, Nietzsche believes there is a 
This is why many scholars would think that genealogy is anti-metaphysical by its very nature. 
For example, see David Couzens Hoy 'Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method', collected in 
Schacht(1994). 
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correlation between a value system and the type person who has invented it. The 
relation is that people invent a value system in order to satisfy their psychological 
needs and practical interest. For example, he says: 
Every animal... instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable 
conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its 
maximal feeling of power... (GM 3, §7) 
Thus in the history of morality a will to power finds expression, through 
which now the slaves and oppressed, now the ill-constituted and those 
who suffer from themselves, now the mediocre attempts to make those 
values judgments prevail that are favorable to them. (WP, 400) 
Brian Leiter calls this view as 'the Prudence Thesis' which claims that 
'evaluative systems - more precisely, their general prevalence in a culture - serve 
the prudential interests of particular types of persons and that they are typically 
38 
promoted by persons whose interests they a d v a n c e ' . 
Conversely, Nietzsche thinks that we can infer the kind of person from the 
value system he espouses. He says, ‘even apart from the value of such claims as 
"there is a categorical imperative in us,, one can still always ask: what does such a 
claim tell us about the man who makes it?，（BGE, §187). Thus, for Nietzsche, value 
system is treated as ‘a sing language of the affects' (BGE, §187) and 
'symptomatology' from which we can infer the correlated kind of person^^. 
38 Brian Leiter, 'Morality in the Pejorative Sense', British Journal of History for Philosophy, 1995, 
Vol.3, p. 120. 
39 For further discussion of symtomatology, please refer to Daniel Conway 'Genealogy and Critical 
Method', collected in Schacht (1994). 
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It goes without saying that the inference from the value system to its correlated 
inventor and supporter it can never be absolutely certain and accurate. In fact, 
Nietzsche knows this point very well as he always calls his account of the origin as 
'hypothesis' (GM, Preface, §5). Also, Nietzsche is surely not the first one to study 
the psychological origin of morality. British psychologists such as David Hume and 
Herbert Spencer have investigated the psychological origin of morality. What makes 
Nietzsche's position more superior than theirs is that Nietzsche's hypothesis is not 
merely a conjecture, but is also supported by historical evidence. As Nietzsche says, 
his aim is for 'an actual history of morality' and to this end, 'it must be obvious 
which color is a hundred times more vital for a genealogist of morals than blue: 
namely gray, that is, what is documented, what can actually be confirmed and has 
actually exited, in short the entire long hieroglyphic record, so hard to decipher, of 
the moral past of mankind' (GM Preface, §7; emphasis added). 
From his criticism of the British psychologists, Nietzsche seems to say that one 
can propose many hypotheses about the inventor from the same value system. One 
can easily go astray in conjecturing the origin of morals from one's prejudice and 
predilection. The historical evidence comes into remedy at this point by functioning 
as a checkpoint of our hypothesis. Any acceptable hypothesis of origin must be 
supported by historical evidences. 
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B. Genealogy as a Method of Revaluation 
After examining the genealogy method, we now turn to the purpose which the 
method serves. Nietzsche emphasizes more than once that ‘my real concern was 
something much more important than hypothesis-mongering, whether my own or 
other people's, on the origin of morality...what was at stake was the value of 
morality' (GM Preface, §5). But in what way does genealogy help to determine the 
value of morality? Isn't Nietzsche's idea a typical instance of the genetic fallacy (i.e. 
to determine the value of something by considering its origin)? 
As far as I know, the best answer to the above questions is provided by Brian 
Leiter. Leiter firstly emphasizes that Nietzsche is fully aware of the genetic fallacy 
and knows very clear that the origin of something cannot directly determine its 
value. For example, Nietzsche says 'even if a morality has grown out of an error, the 
realization of this fact would not so much as touch the problem of its value' (GS, 
345) and 'the inquiry into the origin of our evaluations and tables of the good is in 
absolutely no way identical with a critique of them, as is often believed' (WP, 
254)40. 
But that does not imply that the origin of morality has nothing to do with its 
Leiter, Ibid. p. 119. 
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value. It only means that the connection is an indirect one. Leiter explains the 
relation between the origin and the value of morality in two steps. Genealogy can 
determine the value of morality because: (1) discovering the origins of morality (or 
in Leiter's words 'morality in the pejorative sense') sheds light on the types of 
people whose interests that morality serves and (2) the objection to that morality is 
precisely that it serves the interests of certain types of people at the expense of the 
o the/ i . 
Step (1) is mentioned in our previous discussion of the psychological side of 
genealogy. Step (2) explains in what way genealogy can be a method of revaluation. 
After uncovering the type of person whose interest the Christian ethics serves, 
Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity is that it serves the interests of the slave at the 
expense of the overman^�. In Leiter's view, this is the heart of Nietzsche's criticism 
of Christianity and its morality because Nietzsche says: 
When a decadent type of man ascended to the rank of the highest type, 
this could only happen at the expense of its counterytpe, the type of 
man that is strong and sure of life. (EH, III, 5) 
Leiter, Ibid, p. 120. 
I substitute Leiter's wording 'the lowest man' and 'the higher man' with the more common terms 
'the slave' and 'the overman'. 
That the lowest man refers to the slave or the priestly type of person is not controversial. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, it is the priest who invents the Christian ethics and its religious 
underpinnings. 
Leiter uses of the term 'the higher man，to summarize the text 'the highest power and splendor 
possible to the type man...' (GM, Preface §6). But this meaning is the same as the overman, who is 
the potentiality of nature. See my later discussion in Chapter 6. 
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What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the 'good', likewise 
a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present 
was possibly living at the expense of the future? ...So that precisely 
morality would be to blame if the highest power and splendor possible 
to the type man was never in fact attained? (GM, Preface §6) 
Although the above explanation leaves many questions unanswered (e.g. what 
does the overman mean), it is enough for the present purpose to understand how the 
genealogy can determine the value of morality. Yet, one may feel that this account 
of genealogy is rather abstract. If so, I can only ask for patience on the part of 
readers. To know genealogy more concretely, one would have to know the actual 
operation of it, which would be seen in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 4 Genealogy of Christianity 
My aim in this chapter is to explore Nietzsche's genealogy of Christianity. It is 
my belief that we can understand Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity only if we 
understand his account of the origin of Christianity and that the three essays in GM 
contain Nietzsche's most detailed and systematic description of how Christianity 
comes into being through an analysis of the psychology of the priest. Therefore, in 
order to pave the way for understanding Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity in the 
next chapter, detailed exposition of GM is required. 
As my aim to interpret GM as a study of the birth of Christianity is quite 
unusual and against the prevalent interpretation, I would probably encounter two 
objections. Firstly, people may object that GM is a book about morality and has 
nothing to do with Christianity. Second, people may object that though Nietzsche 
sometimes attacks Christianity in GM, its target is the Christian ethics and has 
nothing to do with Christianity as a religion. These two prejudices are what I want 
to dispel before working out my interpretation of GM. I will show that the first 
objection involves over-generalization of Nietzsche's target and the second involves 
a false dichotomy between morality and religion. 
The title of GM may mislead readers to think that it is a book that contains 
Nietzsche's view on morality as such. But this interpretation, though popular, is 
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wrong. The target of GM is not morality as such, but specifically the morality of 
Christianity'*^. Nietzsche is not saying that every kind of morality that involves the 
distinction of good and evil is slave morality. Rather, he specifically says that 'with 
the Jews there begins the slave revolt in morality' (GM I, §6) and 'from the trunk of 
that tree of vengefiilness and hatred, Jewish hatred...there grew something equally 
incomparable a new love' (GM I, §7). And he refers by this ‘new love' to the 
teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. 
To the second objection, I would draw reader's attention to the interconnection 
among the Christian ethics and its religious doctrines. Nietzsche tells us 
'Christianity is a system, a whole view of things thought out together' (TIIX §5). In 
the Introduction, I have said that every moral system has to answer the question of 
‘why should I be moral'. Though the moral rules in Christianity have the absolute 
character (e.g. the Ten Commandments), it cannot answer the meta-ethical question 
by saying ‘because it is the command of God'. It is because we can still ask 'why 
should we obey God's commands?' The case is either that God has reason for His 
commands or He has not. In the later case, we have no reason to obey Him. In the 
former case, the Christian ethics would lose its distinctive character because the 
43 It must be emphasized that though Nietzsche's target is the Christian ethics, his criticism can be 
applied to other moral systems. It is because Nietzsche holds that Christianity is the basis of western 
morality. Many secular moralities share the values (e.g. equality, love, peace) that Christianity 
treasures. 
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justificatory reason would be independent of the one who makes the commands. We 
have reason to follow the moral rules if they are well justified. That the rules are 
commands made by God is superfluous for their justification. The result would be 
that the role of God is severely undermined and the Christian ethics loses its 
distinguishing c h a r a c t e r 44. Thus, Christianity would answer this meta-ethical 
question through its religious doctrines. Its typical answer is that we should follow 
the ethical rules because our human nature has fallen from the ideal state and that 
obeying the rule would bring salvation to us. In my interpretation, the three essays 
in GM correspond to the threefold structure of the Christian ethics^ —’. Essay one is 
about the basis of the moral precepts while the second and third are about the human 
nature and the ideal respectively. We will now turn to the content of the three 
essays. 
4.1 The Morality of Good and Evil 
The first essay of GM is about the slave revolt against the master. 'The slave' 
does not refer to those who are low in social status. In other words, it is not those 
who from the bottom of a society launch the revolt against the master. Quite to the 
44 This dilemma is presented by John Hospers in his Human Conduct, p.32-4. 
My reading of GM emphasizes (1) the connection among the three essays and (2) the connection 
between the Christian morality and its religious belief. For (2), 1 am inspired by Maclntyre's analysis 
of the Aristotelian ethical tradition in After Virtue. For (1)，I am deeply indebted to Maudemarie 
Clark. I find that Clark's reading of GM and her study of Nietzsche are highly original and 
persuasive. 
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contrary, it is the priestly aristocratic that launches the revolt against the knightly 
aristocratic. In my reading, Nietzsche is actually using two sets of distinctions. The 
first is the distinction between the noble or aristocratic class and the common 
people, which is drawn according to the criterion of social status. In this sense, the 
priests are certainly among the noble class since they enjoy high social status in the 
ancient world. Just like the other noble classes, the priestly mode of valuation arises 
out of the pathos of distance. The priest calls someone 'the pure' 'who washes 
himself, who forbids himself certain foods that produce skin ailments, who does not 
sleep with the dirty women of the lower class' (GM I, §6). 
However, Nietzsche says ‘one will have divined already how easily the priestly 
mode of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop 
into its opposite; this is particularly likely when the priestly caste and the warrior 
caste are in jealous opposition to one another and are unwilling to come to terms' 
(GM I’ §7). 
It is at this point that Nietzsche introduces the second set of distinction. This is 
the distinction between the master and the slave, which is drawn according to the 
physical strength. The knightly aristocratic is said to have ‘a powerful physicality, a 
flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to 
preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war game and in general all that 
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involves vigorous, free, joyful activity' (GM I，§7). 
The corresponding morality for the knightly class is the master morality, which 
is essentially a mode of triumphant affirmation and self-glorification (GM I, §2). 
The masters feel themselves to be superior in power and character than the 
low-minded, plebeian. It is out of this pathos of distance and nobility that they 
establish themselves and their action as good. They call what is contrary to them 
and their action as bad. They seek their opposition only for affirming itself more 
gratefully and triumphantly. The negative concepts (e.g. bad, low) in master 
morality are thus only a subsequently invented pale and contrasting image in 
relation to its positive concepts (GM I，§10). For the master, the weak or the 
impotent is simply an object for contempt, not hatred. 
There is no place for hatred and ressentiment in the master morality. Being 
strong, the masters acquire the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget 
(More accurately, they are the embodiment of such power, i.e. these powers are not 
an external object to them). Also, they consummate and exhaust the ressentiment, if 
there is any, in immediate action and therefore ressentiment will not pile up. 
To the contrary, the priests are physically weak and continuously lose in the 
competition of political superiority with the knightly aristocratic. From the 
continuous defeats, the priests (1) develop a strong and permanent sense of 
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impotence. They feel that they are irremediably weak and hopeless to improve their 
situation. However, (2) their lust to rule remains intact from the losses. They 
conceive themselves as deserving the ruling power and refuse to resign. These two 
psychological states make their hatred of the master grow to 'monstrous and 
uncanny proportions' (GM I，§7)46. hatred of the slave is the repressed one 
because they cannot express their hatred outwardly. Nietzsche calls this repressed 
vengefulness as ressentiment (GM I, §7)47. 
Presumably, there are many things that the priestly class can do in order to 
release their hatred"^^. In the case of the Jews, they come up with the most powerful 
means of revenge. Nietzsche says 'the Jews, that priestly people, who in opposing 
their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a 
radical revaluation of their enemies' values, that is to say, an act of the most 
spiritual revenge' (GM I, §7). 
The slave revolt starts by saying ‘No’ to what is outside, what is different from 
them and what is not itself. They call the conditions which contribute to the success 
of the masters as evil (GM I，§7). On the other hand, the slave calls what is contrary 
to the birds of prey (the master), i.e. the lambs (the salve themselves) to be good. 
46 I come to realize the transition from the sense of impotence to ressentiment from Bernard 
Reginster's profound analysis of ressentiment. See Reginster (1997), p.285-287. 
47 Nietzsche discerns the element of ressentiment from passages in the Bible and writings of 
Christian theologians. See GMI §15 and A §45. 
48 Reginster listed two alternatives to spiritual revenge and explain why the priest refuses to adopt 
them. See ibid. p. 287-289. 
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They call their impotence to requite as goodness of heart, the lowliness as humility, 
subjection to those one hates as obedience (GM I, §14)49. 
Nietzsche emphasizes that 'the need to direct one's view outward instead of 
back to oneself is of the essence of ressentiment and that slave's action is 
'fundamentally reaction' (GM I, §7). His reason is probably that the slaves find 
nothing valuable in themselves. Since the men of ressentiment suffer from 
continuous defeats, they have strong sense of impotence and can find nothing 
affirmable in themselves. Thus, their valuation is essentially derived from denying 
the valuation of their enemy and they find themselves valuable only because they do 
not resemble the master. 
The revaluation of the master's valuation can bring several advantages to the 
slave. Firstly, the slaves can persuade themselves that the traits of master are not 
genuine goods and thus they should not feel regret for the lack of these traits. 
Secondly, by introducing the moral standard of evaluation, they regard themselves 
as more superior and worthy than the masters. Thirdly, their secrete desire, the lust 
for power, is also satisfied through the introduction of religious doctrine. In the case 
of Christianity, the relevant doctrine is the last judgment, where justice will be done 
and the weak and humble will be exhorted. 
49 GM 1，§14 
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In addition to the above psychological advantages, advocating the slave morality 
can also favor the survival of the slave. This can be seen from the anti-natural (in 
the sense of condemning the natural instincts and preaching the extirpation of 
them)5G and self-denial (in the sense of disapproving self-interest in favor of 
altruism) character of slave morality. On the one hand, the content of the slave 
morality must ban all the bodily desire, strength and instincts as necessarily evil. 
Only thus can they achieve revenge against the master. If all, including the master, 
conceives the physicality in this way, the main threat to the slave is renounced. On 
the other hand, the slave morality is 'essentially a morality of utility', advocating the 
virtue of pity, altruism, neighbor love and others, because they are 'the only means 
for enduring the pressure of existence' (BGE §260). Bearing the anti-natural and 
self-denial character of slave morality is very important as we shall see that they 
play a significance role in connecting up the three essays of GM. 
Up to now, sensitive reader may wonder what do the corresponding historical 
figures that the terms 'master' and 'slave' refer to. The metaphor of master and 
slave must to some extent correspond to the real history of Christianity. Otherwise, 
we cannot see the relevance of Nietzsche's hypothesis. This question is very 
This meaning of anti-natural is stated by Nietzsche in 'Morality as Anti-Nature' of TI. That 
Christianity is anti-natural can be seen from Matthew 5:29-30，where it is said ‘If your right eye 
causes you to sin, tear it our and throw it away.' Other relevant passages include Matthew 18:6-9; 
Romans 7:5, 7:18, 8:4. 
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complicated. In this context, I can only make three general remarks. Firstly, 
Nietzsche tells us that 'the two opposing values "good and bad", "good and evil" 
have been engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years... the symbol 
of this struggle, inscribed in the letters legible across all human history, is "Rome 
against Judea, Judea against Rome".. . ' (GM I, § 1 6 ) � T h a t is to say, the slave and 
the master do not refer to a single human being, but to two races. Also, the slave 
revolt does not refer to a discrete historical event, but a development that takes place 
over a long period of time. Secondly, it is the Jews who firstly launched the slave 
revolt against the master: 'this inversion of value (which includes using the word 
"poor" as synonymous with "holy" and "friend") constitutes the significance of the 
Jewish people: they make the beginning of the slave rebellion in morals' (BGE 
§195)-’2. However, quite contrary to our common understanding, the founder of 
Christianity that Nietzsche has in mind is not Jesus of Nazareth, but the Jewish rabbi 
Paul. It is because Nietzsche thinks that message of Jesus is in diametrical 
opposition to Paul. Although this point is interesting and need to be explained 
further, it is less related to Nietzsche's criticism of the Christian moral and religious 
Also, Nietzsche says 'Christianity was the vampire of the imperium Romanum: overnight it undid 
the tremendous deed of the Romans - who had won the ground for a great culture that would have 
time.' (A, §58) 
52 In oppose to the common opinion that Christianity is superior to Judaism, Nietzsche emphasizes 
their continuity. He holds that the slave revolt begins with Judaism and then continued by 
Christianity. See A §24-27 and also Tim Murphy's 'Nietzsche's Narrative of the Retroactive 
Confiscations of Judaism', collected in Santaniello (2001) 
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teachings, which is the central topic of this thesis. I will return to this point in 
Chapter 6 when I evaluate Nietzsche's understanding of Christianity. 
4.2 The Interpretation of Human Nature 
Essay II opens with the paradoxical task of breeding an animal with the right to 
make promise. Nietzsche is tricky in his wording. Here, making promise has a 
special meaning of taking up obligation in various kinds of human relationship. As 
his later discussion reveals, Nietzsche thinks that the contractual relationship applies 
to the relations with other persons, wit the state, with the ancestor and with the God. 
In order to carry out the obligation in each kind of relationship, man must be first 
become 'calculable, regular and necessary' (GM II §1). 
The reason why this task is paradoxical is that human being is by its very nature 
forgetful. In Nietzsche view, forgetfulness is an active faculty that helps to preserve 
the psychic order, repose and etiquette. Hence, for promise to become possible, 
memory must be created between the original 'I will' and the actual discharge of the 
will. Here, 'memory' stands for an active desire not to getting rid of something. 
So interpreted, it is clear how this essay is related to the first. The distinction 
between good and evil is just the basis of various moral precepts. In order for us to 
follow the precepts, the precepts themselves must be burned in our memory. 
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According to Nietzsche's analysis, there are two ways of keeping the 
something in mind. The first way is through the method of punishment. The 
rationale of this method is 'if something is to stay in the memory it must be burned 
in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory'. Nietzsche enumerates 
various cruel punishments in the past (e.g. stoning, breaking on the wheel, piercing 
with stakes, tearing apart or trampleing by horses etc) and conclude that 'with the 
aid of such images and procedures one finally remembers five or six "I will 
not，s,，,(GM II §3). 
This quotation also indicates the limit of the method of punishment. Although 
the punishment can keep something in our memory, it has the opposite effect of 
arousing our indignation and resistance. As Nietzsche tells us in the later sections, 
'it (punishment) strengthens the power of resistance' and 'prevents the criminal 
from considering his deed, the type of his action as such, reprehensible: for he sees 
exactly the same kind of actions practiced in the service of justice' (GM II, §14). 
The actual result of punishment is that it heightens the prudence and makes us 'to go 
to work more cautiously, mistrustfully, secretly' (GM II, §15). It cannot make us to 
feel that ‘I ought not to have done that，，a recognition both of the existence and the 
binding force or validity of the rule. 
A better way of ensuring people to fulfill their obligation is through the bad 
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conscience. According to Nietzsche, bad conscience is developed when man finds 
himself finally enclosed within the walls of state, which is built by the master race 
with their tremendous will to power (i.e. the expansive and form-giving forces)]). 
The master races contribute to the emergence of the bad conscience by inhibiting 
their citizens to discharge their instincts outward. Interestingly, the instincts which 
Nietzsche has in mind are mainly the instinct of cruelty, which includes 'hostility, 
cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction' (GM II §16). 
Although these instincts can no longer be discharged outwardly, their intensity 
remains the same. Nietzsche thinks that the instinct of cruelty that cannot be 
discharged outwardly turn inwardly against the possessor himself. He calls the 
process as ‘the internalization of man' (GM II, §16). 
But what would the will to power turn against? And what kind of form would it 
impose? The answer can be found in this passage: ‘For fundamentally it is the same 
active force that is at work on a grander scale in those artists of violence and 
organizers who build states, and that here, internally, on a smaller and pettier scale, 
directed backward... creates for itself a bad conscience and builds negative ideals — 
namely, the instinct of freedom (in my language: the will to power); only here the 
material upon which the form-giving and ravishing nature of this force vents itself is 
53 Nietzsche gives this definition of will to power in GM II Section 13, p.515. 
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man himself, his whole ancient animal self..: (GM II §18; emphasis added). 
This passage indicates that with the internalization of the instinct of cruelty, 
man begins to treat himself and especially his animal nature as enemy and as ugly. 
They try to impose form upon themselves. And the form that they try to impose 
upon themselves is exactly the denial of their animal nature. This is why Nietzsche 
says his account of the origin of bad conscience may be a hint in explaining 'how 
the contradictory concepts such as selflessness, self-denial, self-sacrifice can 
suggest an ideal, a kind of beauty' (GM II §18). 
The connection between bad conscience and the moral rules should now 
become clear. If man feels his animal instinct (which is the source of disobedience) 
to be ugly, if the antithesis of his animal instinct is erected as an ideal, then he 
would naturally have motive of obeying the moral rule. 
However, the priest of Christianity does not simply stop with the bad 
conscience. On the contrary, the priests push 'the bad conscience to its most terrible 
and most sublime height' (GM II §19). They invoke the moralization of guilt, which 
represents the will of man 'to erect an ideal - that of the 'holy God'- and in the face 
of it to feel the palpable certainty of his own absolute unworthiness' (GM II §22). 
According to Nietzsche, the civil-law relationship between the debtor and his 
creditor holds in the relationship between the present generation of a race and its 
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ancestors. It is because the ancient people believe that it is through the sacrifices and 
accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists and thus one is indebted to 
them and has to pay them back. The repayment includes the sacrifices of food, 
feasts, music, honor and above all obedience. This explains why traditional customs 
are so strictly followed in the past. Moreover, the fear of the ancestor and his power, 
and the consciousness of indebtedness to him increase as the power of the tribe 
itself increases. If the tribe becomes extremely powerful, the ancestor is easily 
transfigured into a god through the imagination of growing fear and feeling of 
indebtedness. 
If we follow the above logic, it is natural to conclude that the advent of the 
Christian God that is conceived to be omnipotent is accompanied by the maximum 
feeling of guilty indebtedness. Indeed, Nietzsche says it is here that ‘man of bad 
conscience has seized upon the presupposition of religion so as to drive his 
self-torture to its most gruesome pitch of severity and rigor' (GM II §22). This 
refers to the moralization of guilt whose aim is to preclude the prospect of final 
repayment. The moralization involves two processes. At first, the man of bad 
conscience conceives their debt to God as irredeemable so that they can suffer from 
irredeemable penance. Then, the irredeemable debt is turned against the creditor. 
This refers to the Christian teaching that God sacrifices himself for the sin of 
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mankind out of love. After this moralization of guilt, God is erected as an ideal, 
before whom men would feel themselves as absolutely worthless and 
reprehensible^"^. 
The above analysis only offers an account of the origin of guilt. However, it 
tells us nothing about why the priest would invent such concept. One possibility is 
that both bad conscience and guilt help to enforce the moral rules. By interpreting 
our animal nature as ugly, they form the basis for following the moral rule which 
would improve the original human nature. Perhaps, it is just an accidental fact that 
the Christian priests push the self-cruelty into extreme height and invent the concept 
of guilt. This could be a plausible answer. However, my own reading is that the 
invention of guilt serves another purpose, namely the explanation of human 
suffering. It leads us to the third essay of GM. 
4.3 The Ascetic Ideal 
The main theme of Eassay III is about the meaning of the ascetic ideal. The 
first thing I want to tackle is about the element of ascetic ideal. The term 'ascetic 
ideal' consists of two parts, namely the ascetic rule and an ideal which explains the 
purpose of ascetic rule. There is no dispute that the ascetic rule is essentially 
54 Thus interpreted, guilt refers to the sense of absolute worthlessness before the holly God. 
Specifically, this feeling is due to the doctrine of original sin and sacrifice of God. 
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self-denial and anti-natural. Elimination of desires (especially the sexual desire) is 
the essential feature of the ascetic rules. But it should be emphasized that the ascetic 
rule is actually the same as the slave morality discussed in essay I. As I have argued 
earlier, the slave morality is essentially self-denial and anti-natural in character. 
These characteristics are also essential for the ascetic rules. Moreover, both the 
ascetic ideal and slave morality are actually invented by the priest. It is naturally to 
assume that the ascetic rule is tantamount to the slave morality. 
Another element of ascetic ideal is the ideal which man should strive for. 
However, Nietzsche's main concern is about the evaluation of our worldly life that 
is implicit in the ideal. As he says, ‘the idea at issue here is the valuation the ascetic 
priest places on our life: he juxtaposes it with a quite different mode of existence 
which it opposes and excludes, unless it turn against itself, deny itself ...in that case, 
the case of the ascetic life, life counts as a bridge to that mode of existence'(GM III 
§11). That is to say, the priest treats our worldly life as worthless in itself and has 
value only as a means for the other mode of existence, which is exactly the denial of 
our worldly life. 
The relationship between the ascetic rule (or slave morality) and the ideal is not 
difficult to see. In fact, they imply each other. On the one hand, if we hold a 
negative attitude toward the world life, we will look for error precisely where the 
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instinct of life most unconditionally posits truth. On the other hand, the ascetic rule, 
which is self-denial and anti-natural in character, makes sense only if we devaluate 
our worldly life. 
Another issue that we should clarify is about Nietzsche's question 'what is the 
meaning of ascetic ideal?' It is not immediately clear what he wants to ask. Section 
23 provides us with the answer: 'it is my purpose here to bring to light, not what this 
ideal has done, but simply what it means; what it indicates; what lies hidden behind 
it, beneath it, in it... What is the meaning of the power of this ideal, the monstrous 
nature of its power? Why has it been allowed to flourish to this extent? Why has it 
not rather been resisted?' (GM III, §23; emphasis added) 
In other words, Nietzsche is asking why is the ascetic ideal so powerful. This 
question stems from two facts. The first is that in Nietzsche's view, the ascetic ideal 
is 'one of the most widespread and enduring of all phenomena' (GM III, §11). It 
appears in almost all ages, all classes and in various forms (e.g. art, philosophy and 
even science). It is so universal and pervasive that the earth deserves to be called 
'ascetic planet，”. Secondly, the ascetic ideal is self-contradicting in the sense that it 
turns against the condition of life. ‘It will look for error precisely where the instinct 
of life most unconditionally posits truth' (GM III，§12). Given its paradoxical 
55 To see the universality of ascetic ideal, see Clark (1990), Chapter 6 where she argues that the 
ideals of philosophers and artist, and the unconditional will to truth of science are different forms of 
the priestly ideal. 
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character, Nietzsche wants to investigate why it remains so powerful as an ideal and 
what remain hidden in it. It leads to Nietzsche's analysis of how the ascetic ideal is 
inventecf6. 
Nietzsche's answer to the question is that the self-contradicting character of the 
ascetic ideal is apparent. That the ascetic ideal is against life is only a provisional 
formulation. In fact, the ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a 
degenerating life which tries by all means to sustain its existence. Although the 
ascetic ideal is the desire to be in a different place, this desire helps to create more 
favorable conditions for being here. But how is this possible? 
I think there are three aspects that the priest with the help of the ascetic ideal 
creates more favorable condition for being in this world力.First, the priest wages a 
war of cunning against the beasts of prey. Here, Nietzsche refers to slave's spiritual 
revenge against the master which is mentioned in the first essay. 
Secondly, the priest defends the herd from anarchy and disintegration within the 
herd, in which ressentiment is constantly accumulating. Here, Nietzsche turns to the 
discussion of suffering. In his view, every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause (a 
guilty agent) for his suffering and upon which he can vent his affects. By doing so, 
56 One more evidence for my interpretation can be found in EH where it is stated ‘the third inquiry 
offers the answer to the question whence the ascetic ideal, the priests' ideal, derives its tremendous 
power although it is the harmful ideal par excellence, a will to the end, an ideal of decadence' (EH HI 
8). 
57 It should be noted that these three aspects also explain how the priest comes to power and wins his 
kingdom over the herd. 
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the sufferer can win relief and deaden his pain. The desire to deaden pain by means 
of affects is, in Nietzsche's view, the actual physiological cause of ressentiment. The 
reasoning 'someone or other must be to blame for my feeling ill' is common to all 
the sufferers. 
If ressentiment is unchecked, it may well turn into a state of war in which 
everyone is against everyone and the herd association will disintegrate. At this point, 
the ascetic priest prevents the anarchy of the herd by altering the direction of the 
ressentiment. They tell the herd, 'Quite so, my sheep! Someone must be to blame 
for it" but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it - you alone 
are to blame for yourself (GM III §15). 
To achieve the redirection of ressentiment, some typically Christian concepts are 
invented, such as 'guilt', 'sin', sinfulness', 'depravity', 'damnation' and 'free will'. 
These inventions help to 'exploit the bad instinct of all sufferers for the purpose of 
self-discipline, self-surveillance and self-overcoming' (GM III §16). 
More importantly, these inventions help the herd to convince themselves that 
their suffering is reasonable and even desirable. In Nietzsche's view, the reason why 
the sufferers feel their suffering unbearable is simply that they cannot find a 
justification for it. The sufferers think that they do not deserve it and that their 
suffering is absurd because it serves no purpose. And they desire a meaning for their 
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suffering. He describes the psychology of sufferers as this, 'man, suffering from 
himself in some way or other but in any case physiologically like an animal shut up 
in a cage, uncertain why or wherefore, thirsting for reasons -reasons relieve -
thirsting, too for remedies and narcotics... ' (GM III，§20). 
Now the ascetic priest provides such a justification of suffering to the herd. 
Through the concept of 'sin', 'punishment' and 'redemption', the priest directs the 
sufferers' attention to the past and interprets their suffering as punishment that they 
deserve to have. Suddenly, not only suffering but also life as a whole acquires a 
meaning and 'the old depression, heaviness and weariness were indeed overcome 
through this system of procedure (i.e. the procedure of looking at the past and 
reinterpreting the suffering); life again became very interesting...one no longer 
protested against pain, one thirsted for pain.. . ' (GM III， §20). Nietzsche 
emphatically calls this means of deadening the pain of suffering as the guilty means 
(GM II, §19). This distinguishing function of explaining the suffering of human 
c o 
being may be the real origin of the concept of gu i l t ' . 
Before ending this chapter, I would say a few words about Nietzsche's answer 
for the powerfulness of the ascetic priest. His answer is simply that 'man would 
58 This function is bom out by Romans 5:3 'And not only that, but we also boast in our sufferings, 
knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character 
produces hope.. . ' and Romans 8:17-18 i consider that the suffering of this present time are not 
worth comparing with the glory about to be revealed to us’ 
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rather will nothingness than not will'. Put more straightly, 'the meaningfulness of 
suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far - and the 
ascetic ideal offered man meaning! It was the only meaning offered so far; any 
meaning is better than none at all...’(GM III，§28). 
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Chapter 5 Nietzsche^s Criticism of Christianity 
It is now time to see what criticism Nietzsche can draw from his genealogy of 
Christianity. As I have explained in Chapter 3, genealogy is basically a study of the 
value-type correlation. It helps to determine the worth of Christianity by revealing 
that it would favor the flourishing of slave at the expense of the overman. If this is 
Nietzsche's way of revaluation, several questions would follow. Firstly, who are the 
slaves? And what makes them so undesirable? Secondly, the other side of the 
question is: what is the overman? And what makes him so valuable? Thirdly, in 
what way does the flourishing of the slave hamper the development of overman? 
In this chapter, I would concentrate on answering the third question while 
answering the first two questions briefly. I would argue that Christianity thwarts the 
development of the overman through its nihilistic effects. Putting less emphasis on 
the first two questions is consistent with Nietzsche's philosophy for his main 
concern is to show the bad effects of Christianity and thereby end its tyranny, rather 
than to criticize the character of the slave. I would explain these points in turns in 
the following sections. 
5.1. The Slave and the Overman 
The slaves are those who suffer from nature. Nietzsche says ‘he who suffers 
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from it (nature)...the preponderance of feelings of displeasure over feelings of 
pleasure is the cause of this fictitious morality and r e l i g i o n . ( A §15) The suffering 
that Nietzsche refers to includes the suffering from natural hardship and from the 
strength of the master. For the slaves, these sufferings cause their ressentiment to 
pile up. The result is that, on the one hand, they launch spiritual revenge by turning 
the master morality upside down. Through the slave morality, they find basis for 
thinking that they worth more than the master. On the other hand, they divide the 
world into a realm of higher value (i.e. the true world) and the world of less value 
(i.e. the appearance world). From this two-world bifurcation, they confer their 
suffering a meaning and their life a hope. 
What makes the slaves undesirable is that their evaluation is necessarily 
self-deceptive. The men of ressentiment necessarily falsifies the reality so as to 
make them feel more comfortable. Nietzsche would criticize this type of people of 
lacking integrity. Regisnter has argued for this point at great length in his paper 
'Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation，Although I believe that any evaluation 
based on ressentiment is necessarily self-deceptive, I cannot agree with Regisnster 
that this is Nietzsche's main criticism of Christianity. In my interpretation, 
Nietzsche's objection is more on the nihilistic effect of their value system (i.e. 
59 Bernard Reginster, 'Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation', Philosophy & Phenomenological 
Research 57 (1997). 
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Christianity), which is detrimental to the overman, than on the character of the slave. 
In the Preface of GM, for instance, Nietzsche says his real concern is about the 
value of moral values^^. He says 'what if a symptom of regression were inherent in 
the "good", likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the 
present was possibly living at the expense of the future?... So that precisely morality 
would be to blame if the highest power and splendor actually possible to the type of 
man was never attained?' (GM Preface, §6; emphasis added). That is to say, his real 
criticism is on the bad effect of Christianity. 
For Nietzsche, the overman is the potentiality of the nature. His general idea is 
that ' . . . the world might be far more valuable than we used to believe; we must see 
through the naivete of our (i.e. the Christian) ideals, and while we thought that we 
accorded it the highest interpretation, we may not even have given our human 
existence a moderately fair value' (WP §32). The overman is the person who could 
make positive use of the natural instinct to serve the purpose of self-perfection. He 
could find the intrinsic value in every moment of his life so that he is able to will the 
eternal recurrence of the same life^^ 
What makes the overman so desirable is that he is the remedy to the impending 
6° For example, Nietzsche says 'what was at stake was the value of morality... what was especially at 
stake was the value of the "unegoistic, the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice...' (GM, 
Preface, §5) 
61 The sublimation for the purpose of self-perfection and the unconditional affirmation of life are the 
important features of the Overman. See Leiter (1995), Aloni (1991) Chapter 8 and also Kaufmann 
(1974) Chapter 5. 
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nihilism with the death of God. There is an immanent potentiality of the nature 
which we fail to realize under the influence of the shadow of God (i.e. the 
presuppositions of Christianity), Therefore, what Nietzsche tries to do is to point out 
the nihilistic effect of Christianity and thereby 'putting an ends its tyranny and 
cleansing the way for new ideals, of more robust ideals...' (WP, §361) 
5.2. The Nihilistic Effects of Christianity 
In Nietzsche's mind, the Christian ethics and its religious doctrines are 
dangerous and poisonous. Simply put, he characterizes Christianity as a nihilistic 
religion in three ways: (1) its ethics is anti-natural and undermines the base of life, 
(2) its interpretation of human nature brings us unnecessary suffering, (3) its ascetic 
ideal deprives the meaning of this life and science as the latest expression of ascetic 
ideal leads us straight to nihilism. Because of these three points, Nietzsche 
evaluation of Christianity is extremely harsh in comparison with other religions. 
This can be seen from his evaluation of the Christian God. In what follows, I would 
spell out the nihilistic effects of Christianity. 
A. The Christian Ethics 
Firstly, let us concentrate on the Christian ethics at its normative level, i.e. its 
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ethical rules. As I have shown in the previous chapter, the ethical rules of 
Christianity are anti-natural in the sense of prescribing extirpation of passions and 
natural instincts. From Nietzsche's genealogical analysis, its anti-natural character 
can be derived from the logic of slave's revenge. Since the slaves are dominated by 
ressentiment and wants to revenge and since the master type of people are strong in 
physicality, the slaves ban all the traits of the masters as evil. 
From the Bible, many textual evidences can be used to support Nietzsche's 
view. One of the passages that Nietzsche often quotes is the Sermon on the Mount, 
where it is said 'If thy eye offend thee, pluck it out'. Nietzsche seems to interpret 
the passage literally as meaning that the extirpation of instincts if we are ailed by 
them. Other passages include: (1) 'Live by the Spirit, I say, and do not gratify the 
desires of the flesh. For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what the 
Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh' (Galatians 5:16-7); (2) 'While we were living 
in the flesh, our sinful passion, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to 
bear fruit for death' (Roman 7:5); and (3) ‘For I know that nothing good dwells 
within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it，(Roman 
7:18). What is common in these passages is that our body, especially its instinct and 
desires are sources of evil so that we should get rid of them and follow the Spirit. 
What follows from the anti-natural character of Christian ethics? Nietzsche 
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raises two charges from its character. The first is that it achieves only the taming of 
man, but not improvement. The second is that this kind of ethics embodies 
'decadent values' (A§6) and is hostile to life (T VI, §1). In order to understand these 
two charges, explanation of Nietzsche's conception of human life and morality are 
in order. 
One of the basic positions of Nietzsche's philosophy is naturalism, which 
involves two claims: 
(1) metaphysically or ontological speaking, everything is composed of 
natural entities --- those studied in the sciences (on some versions, the 
natural sciences)---whose properties determine all the properties of 
things, persons included; and 
(2) methodologically and/or epistemologically speaking, acceptable 
methods of justification and explanation are continuous, in some sense, 
with those in science^^. 
The relevant naturalistic term that Nietzsche uses to explain the composition 
of cultural phenomenon (e.g. art, culture, morality etc.) and the motivation of human 
behavior is the will to power, which is defined as ‘the spontaneous, aggressive, 
expansive, form-giving forces' (GM II，§12). He regards (1) the will to power as the 
essence of life and the ultimate motivation of human behavior^^, and (2) the 
62 John Post, 'Naturalism' in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 2nd edition, Robert Audi (ed.) 
Nietzsche fulfills the two criteria of naturalism except that the will to power is not studied by 
natural science. While it is questionable whether 'studied by natural science' is a necessary condition 
of naturalism, it suffices in this context to attain the minimum conclusion that Nietzsche's position is 
very approximate to naturalism. 
For example, Nietzsche says 'Life itself is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for 
an accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline' (A §6). See 
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existence of cultural phenomenon^'^ should be understood and explained by it. 
Actually, these two claims are closely related. For the second claim, Nietzsche holds 
that power in its raw form (i.e. the natural passion and instinct) is the soil under 
which human qualities and culture grows. That there is such a sublimation from the 
raw power to more spiritualized manifestation is explained by the fact that human 
being strives for the growth of power. As Kaufmann says, reason is the highest 
manifestation of the will to power in the sense that we gain more power through 
foresight, patience and above all self-mastery which are made possible by 
rationality^^. Therefore, more spiritualized manifestation of will to power is actually 
more powerful because it consists of more rationality. 
The process through which the raw form of desire and passion are transformed 
is sublimation. In Kaufmann's interpretation, sublimation is akin to Hegel's 
aufheben, which involves three elements, namely preserving, canceling and lifting 
up. In the case of sublimation of desire, the intensity of natural desires are preserved, 
their immediate expression cancelled out and their amount of power is lifted up. The 
also BGE §39 & §259. 
64 For example, he says 'Natural qualities and those called properly "human" are indivisibly grown 
together. Man, in his highest and most noble capacities, is wholly nature and embodies its uncanny 
dual character. Those of his abilities which are awesome and considered inhuman are perhaps the 
fertile soil out of which alone all humanity can grow' (Homer's Contest). See also GS §108 and BGE 
§230. 
65 Kaufmann (1974) Chapter 8 p. 230. 
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transformed expression of desire attains more power because there is more element 
of rationality^^ 
Under this background, Nietzsche firstly raises the milder charge that the 
Christian ethics achieves only taming, but not improvement, of man. That is to say, 
the moral person in Christianity (e.g. friendly, peace-loving, humble etc.) does not 
represent improvement over the breast of prey. It is because by waging war against 
the natural instinct, our vitalities are undermined. Man is only 'weakened', made 
'less harmful' and in this sense becomes sick (TI VIII，§2). That they are full of 
'attained sympathetic regard, in readiness to help, in mutual trust' are just because 
the condition for their existence demand them and they are too weak to will 
otherwise. It reflects their incapacity, rather than their moral worth. And such 
'incapacity does not prove progress, only another, later constitution, one which is 
weaker, frailer, more easily hurt, which necessarily generates a morality rich in 
consideration' (TI X，§37). 
A more severe charge is that the Christian ethics is hostile to life. It is so 
because, in his mind, the natural instinct or the raw form of power is the base from 
which human creation and culture grow. By waging war against the natural instinct, 
he thinks Christianity is undermining the base of life and in turn endangering 
66 Kaufmann (1974), Chapter 8’ p.236. ! 
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cultural creation. It is true that offhand the natural instinct can be destructive. But 
Nietzsche thinks what we need is the spiritualization of them, but not castration of 
them as advocated by Christianity. No wonder, Nietzsche says 'on the ground out of 
which Christianity grew, the concept of the "spiritualization of passion" could never 
have been formed' (TI VI, §1). 
In the same vein, he also says that the Christian ethics embodies the 
decadence-value and thus corrupts man. He says, 'I call an animal, a species, or an 
individual corrupt when it loses its instincts, when it chooses, when it prefers, what 
is disadvantageous for it' (A, §6). In other words, Christianity embodies values that 
hamper the development of life and the growth of power. Altruism, pity and equality 
are surely three prominent examples that fall into the category of decadence-value. 
Nietzsche says ‘man is finished when he becomes altruistic' (TI IX, §35). It is 
because he thinks that being self-interested is the necessary condition for our own 
development^^. If we become altruistic, we will give up the opportunity for our 
development. Pity is another decadence-value that Nietzsche opposes. Pity, which in 
German (Mitlenden) means to suffer with others, makes suffering contagious. Also 
when we feel pity, our strength is deprived^^. Nietzsche also criticizes the concept of 
67 For example, he says in WP §369, ‘ "One furthers one's ego always at the expense of others" 
"Life always lives at the expense of other life" - he who does not grasp this has not taken even the 
first step toward honesty with h imsel f . See also, TI IX, §33 where Nietzsche distinguishes two kinds 
of egoism. 
68 Nietzsche advocates the virtue of sympathy, which is based on one's fullness of power, to replace 
7 3 
equality in the saying 'everyone is equal' for the termination of justice and thereby 
endangering the hierarchy of value. The true justice and equality in Nietzsche's 
mind are 'equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal' which accords with the order 
of rank in the nature (TIIX, §48). 
B. The Christian Interpretation of Human Nature and its Ideal 
The Christian interpretation of human nature (i.e. sin, guilty) and the ideal (i.e. 
redemption from sin and strive to the beyond) it espouses are closely related to each 
other. From a functional point of view, they are used to justify the Christian ethics 
by answering the meta-ethical question ‘why should I be moral'. I have explained 
and argued for this point in the last chapter. From a genealogical point of view, they 
are actually two sides of the same coin. When Nietzsche explains the origin of bad 
conscience, he says 'for fundamentally it is the same active force that is at work on 
a grander scale in those artists of violence and organizers who build states, and that 
here, internally on a smaller sand pettier scale, directed backward...creates for itself 
a bad conscience and builds negative ideals…only here the material upon which the 
form-giving and ravishing nature of this force vents itself is man himself, his whole 
ancient animal self..: (GM §18; emphasis added). That is to say, when man is 
the virtue of pity. 
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enclosed in a society and the external discharge of his instinct is blocked, his will to 
power turns inward. He begins to impose form upon his animal nature. The 
imposition of form presupposes that (1) he regards his animal nature to be ugly and 
needs improvement and (2) that there is an ideal that he should strive for. Bad 
conscience, which is the feeling of one's animal nature as ugly, fulfills the first 
presupposition while the ascetic ideal, which delineates a sphere of higher-value, 
fulfills the latter. 
If the will to power is Nietzsche's criterion of evaluation, and if the 
spiritualized expression of will to power contains more power, then Nietzsche seems 
to have no reason to oppose bad conscience and the ascetic ideal because it is these 
two conceptual devices which make the spiritualization of natural instinct possible. 
Without feeling our original nature defective, we have no reason for 
self-overcoming. Indeed, Nietzsche regards the bad conscience as 'the womb of all 
ideal and imaginative phenomena' which brings to light 'an abundance of strange 
new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself (GMII, §18) and as 'an 
illness' that is pregnant of future (GM II, §19). On the ascetic ideal of Christianity, 
Nietzsche also mentions its life-enhancing functions, such as providing a meaning 
of life and preventing anarchy by turning the ressentiment inwards. So, what is so 
objectionable in these two concepts in Nietzsche's eyes? 
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What Nietzsche rejects is guilt, which is developed by Christianity and is the 
bad conscience pushed to the 'most terrible and most sublime height' (GM II, §19). 
He says ‘the moralization of guilt represents the will of man to erect an ideal — that 
of the "holy God"- and in face of it to feel the palpable certainty of his own absolute 
unworthiness' (GM II，§22). The difference between bad conscience and guilt is that 
the latter, through the doctrine of original sin, involves regarding oneself as 
absolutely unworthy before the holy God while the former, which is simply the 
feeling the our animal nature is ugly and requires improvement, does not. Also, bad 
conscience can be alleviated. After we have improved ourselves, the feeling that we 
are ugly can at least be alleviated for some period of time. But it is not the case of 
guilt. According to the teaching of Christianity, sin cannot be redeemed by 
ourselves no matter how hard we have tried. 
In Nietzsche's view, spiritualization of instinct in general and morality in 
particular need not presuppose guilt. In other words, the feeling of guilt brings 
unnecessary suffering to human being. That is why he regards guilt as 'madness of 
the will which is absolutely unexampled' and 'the most terrible sickness that has 
ever raged in man， (GM II’ §22). The resulted suffering should not be 
underestimated for Nietzsche tells us 'is it not dreadful to make necessary and 
regularly recurring sensations (e.g. sexual desires) into a source of inner misery, and 
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in this way to want to make inner misery a necessary and regularly recurring 
phenomenon in every human being?' (D §76) 
As for the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche criticizes that the positive contribution of the 
ascetic ideal is achieved at the cost of depriving the intrinsic meaning of living in 
this world. It is true that our life become interesting and meaningful again when we 
interpret our suffering as punishment and as necessary process for redemption. 
However, Nietzsche reminds us that 'When one place life's center of gravity not in 
life but in the "beyond" - in nothingness - one deprives life of its center of gravity 
altogether' (A, §43). The ordinary life in this world becomes only distraction and 
wrong roads leading us astray from the right path. It has no intrinsic value, but only 
derivative value as a means for the otherworldly life. 
Secondly and more importantly, science as the latest form of ascetic ideal 
deprives the extrinsic or derivative meaning of this world. In the past, the 
life-enhancing function is achieved by turning our life as a means for the goal 
beyond this life. There are many metaphysical and cosmological underpinnings 
behind the ascetic ideal. For example, we have to believe in the existence of other 
world, the existence of omnipotent and just God, immortality of the soul and others. 
However, science as the latest form of ascetic ideal destroys the creditability of 
7 7 
these metaphysical beliefs. Clark has an excellent explanation of this point69. 
According to her interpretation, Nietzsche regards science as the ascetic ideal for the 
following reasons: (1) It represents the unconditional will to truth and requires us to 
give up the comfortable consolation derived from the unjustified beliefs. In this 
sense, science is ascetic. (2) Since unjustified belief sometimes has its utility, doing 
(1) makes sense only if we hold a moral commitment to truthfulness regardless of 
its long-term utility. (3) This commitment makes sense only if we presume that the 
value of truthfulness is connected to another world, such as the faith that God is 
truth and truth is divine^®. 
Since the Enlightenment, the pursuit of science undermines these metaphysical 
beliefs and thereby ceases their life-enhancing function. Kant stands as a decisive 
turning point on this matter. By examining the origin of knowledge, Kant finds that 
we have knowledge only of the phenomenon world. The belief in God, soul and 
freedom is degraded from the status of knowledge to the status of postulate. 
Nietzsche observes that with the status of mere postulate, these metaphysical beliefs 
cease its life-enhancing function: 'The true world-unattainable? At any rate, 
unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, 
69 Clark (1990)，Chapter 6，especially section 4. Another valuable discussion is offered by Randall 
Havas in Havas (1995)，Chapter 4. 
7° Actually, Nietzsche has clearly pointed out that the faith in science is a metaphysical faith and has 
a clear deduction of this conclusion in GS §344 'How we, too, are still pious'. 
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redeeming or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?' (TI V ) 
At the same time, science cannot provide another ideal to replace the one it 
overthrows. In comparison the religious sacrifices of the past, he thinks that the 
sacrifice of human beings and one's strongest instincts are still life-enhancing. At 
least, we are sacrificing them for something (e.g. hope in the future, explanation of 
suffering) in return. But with science, Nietzsche thinks it requires us to 'sacrifice 
God for the nothing'. The unconditional will to truth forces us to 'sacrifice for once 
whatever is comforting, holy, healing; all hope, all faith in hidden harmony, in 
future blisses and justices... '(BGE §55). But for what? We simply do not have an 
answer. It is in this sense that science become life-denying. 
To sum up, the ascetic ideal firstly deprives the intrinsic value of living in this 
world and then secondly the extrinsic value by destroying the credibility of the 
metaphysical goal and presuppositions. The double effects of the ascetic ideal lead 
us straight to nihilism in which we find no meaning and purpose of life except the 
satisfaction of our immediate desires. 
C. The Christian God 
Nietzsche often compares the Christian conception of God with other three 
religions, namely the ancient Judaism, the Greek and the Buddhism. We have 
7 9 
mentioned in the previous chapter that he holds a prudential thesis regarding our 
value system. That is to say, he thinks we adopt or invent a value system in order to 
promote our interest. Thus, the value system we espouse mirrors the type of person 
we are. In his comparative study of religion, he makes a similar assumption about 
our conception of god. He thinks that we invent and believe in a particular 
conception of god in order to support our value system. Therefore, the conception of 
god a group of person adopts reflects their value systems, which in turn reflects the 
type of person they are. The upshot of this assumption is that his evaluation of 
different conceptions of god is ultimately based on his evaluation of different value 
systems. It also implies that his evaluation of different value system is the necessary 
background for us to understand his different evaluations of different religions, 
which at first sight may seem arbitrary. 
In comparison with the ancient Jewish conception of god, Nietzsche says that 
the Christian God is ‘the most corrupt conceptions of the divine ever attained on 
earth'. The transformation from the God of Israel (in the time of the kings) to the 
Christian God 'represents the low-water mark in the descending development of 
divine types' (A, §18). He thinks that the original Jewish religion is a form of 
thankfulness in which we project the conditions that let us prevail and the sense of 
powerfulness into God and offer thanks. Their Yahweh is a god of war and justice. 
8 0 
He embodies the ‘evil’ characters of slave morality, such as ability to harm, wrath, 
envy, cunning and violence. On this point, Nietzsche expresses admiration of the 
traits of God because he thinks that we owe our existence not only to tolerance and 
humanitarianism^'. In contrast, the Christian God is the anti-natural castration of the 
former Jewish conception of God. In Christianity, we find a god who knows only 
love. Just as the Christian ethics is anti-natural, the Christian God as the highest 
ideal inherits the anti-natural character in the sense of extirpating the natural 
instincts. Just as the Christian ethics is harmful to the growth of life, Nietzsche 
regards 'what has been revered as God, not as "godlike" but miserable, as absurd, as 
harmful, not merely as an error but as a crime against life' (A §47). His reason is 
'when a people is perishing, when it feels how its faith in the future and its hope of 
freedom are waning irrevocably, when submission begins to appear to it as the 
prime necessity and it becomes aware of the virtues of the subjugated as the 
conditions of self-preservation' (A, §16). In short, the Christian God is the god of 
the weak and decadence?�. Nietzsche would deny this kind of God as God (A, §47). 
In comparison with the Greek conception of God, Nietzsche objects that the 
Christian God crucifies human beings and makes them suffer. This leads us back to 
71 'Existence' and 'Humanitarianism' are Nietzsche's own wording. See A, §17.1 think his point is 
simply that the so-called 'evil' traits could have positive usages for human existence and cultural 
development. 
72 For a brief sketch of Nietzsche's understanding of Judaism, see Tim Murphy 'Nietzsche's 
Narrative of the "Retroactive Confiscations" of Judaism', collected in Santaniello (2001). 
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the discussion of guilt. We have shown that bad conscience is the awareness of 
one's animal nature as ugly and in this sense is a form of self-cruelty. Guilt (which 
is connected to the Christian doctrine of sin) seizes the religious doctrine and drives 
the self-cruelty into the most extreme form. People invent a conception of God that 
is a pure spirit and in front of which we feel our animal nature as sin and thus feel 
indebted and totally worthless. The Christian God, in Nietzsche's mind, makes man 
suffer. It is true that the Christian God loves human beings. But we must admit that 
we are sinful and helplessness before we know how great the love of God is. For in 
the Bible, love of God is most evidently demonstrated in his sacrifice for sinners: 
'But God proves his love for us in that while we still were sinners Christ died for us’ 
(Roman 5:8), 'God's love was revealed among us in this way: God sent his only Son 
into the world so that we might live through him (I John 4:10). 
In contrast, he finds a more noble use of god in Greek. As well known, the 
Greek gods are sometimes evil. This conception of gods has life-affirming function 
through which the Greek can conceive human misbehavior as 'foolish, not sin’ and 
probably 'deluded by a god' (GM II, §23). In other words, they can put the blame 
on the gods as the originators of evil and thereby justify human wickedness to a 
certain extent. This is not to say that the animal nature in human being needs not be 
overcome. Nietzsche's wording is very misleading, ‘...the Greek gods, those 
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reflections of noble and autocratic men, in whom the animal in man felt deified and 
did not lacerate itself, did not rage against itself (GM II, 23). However, just as 
Nietzsche does not want us to return to the master race, he must think that our 
animal nature needs to be sublimated. In my view, this sublimation is never 
complete and we sometimes find ourselves too impulsive and irrational no matter 
how hard we try. It is on this point that the Greek gods come to rescue us from 
eternal self-blaming. What Nietzsche finds preferable in the Greek gods is that we 
need not deny our life and turn to the beyond just because we are imperfect. 
Through the Greek gods, we can find excuses for our imperfection and thereby 
justify our life in this world. 
We have to be cautious when we come to Nietzsche's comparison with 
Christianity and Buddhism. Generally speaking, Nietzsche does not appreciate 
Buddhism. He characterizes Buddhism as passive nihilism because it preaches 
resignation in respond to human suffering?�. However, when he comes to compare 
Buddhism with Christianity, he finds many positive things of Buddhism. Firstly, he 
thinks that Buddhism is on the right path in the emphasis of 'struggle against 
suffering' rather than against sin. Nietzsche thinks that suffering naturally comes to 
^ F o r a more detailed explanation of Nietzsche hostility against Buddhism, see Robert Morrison 
'Nietzsche and Nirvana', collected in Sananiello (2001). 
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people who have excessive sensitivity. Buddhism takes human suffering as a fact 
and does not look for its metaphysical cause (A, §23). Against suffering, it 
prescribes 'hygienic measures, such as 'life in open air, the wandering life; 
moderation in eating and a careful selection of foods; wariness of all intoxicants, 
wariness also of all emotions that activate the gall bladder or heat the blood... ' (A, 
§20). On these teachings, Nietzsche praises Buddhism as 'posing problems 
objectively and coolly' and ‘the only genuinely positivistic religion' (A, §20). 
Ill contrast, Christianity interprets human suffering as the punishment of our 
original sin. Nietzsche criticizes the weakness behind such interpretation^"^. That is, 
we cannot face the fact that we are suffering. Instead, we make our suffering 
bearable only by finding the metaphysical cause and conferring meaning upon it. 
See GM III, §15 ,20 and A, §23. 
8 4 
Chapter 6 Evaluation of Nietzsche's 
Understanding and Criticism of Christianity 
In this chapter, I am going to evaluate both Nietzsche's understanding and 
criticism of Christianity. I have quite different attitudes to these two aspects of 
Nietzsche's treatment of Christianity. While I appreciate Nietzsche's profound 
analysis of the origin of Christianity, I am skeptical about his criticism of 
Christianity. This difference in attitude is chiefly because that his criticism on 
Christianity is based on his theory of will to power, which is a very hard position to 
maintain. I will explain my view in the following sections. 
6.1. On Nietzsche's Understanding of Christianity 
In my reading, Nietzsche divides Christianity into a kind of morality and its 
religious underpinnings. For the Christian morality, Nietzsche understands it as bom 
out of the emotion of ressentiment. For the religious underpinnings, Nietzsche 
understands the bad conscience as a form of self-cruelty and the ascetic ideal as a 
device of explaining suffering and conferring meaning of being in this world. 
These are Nietzsche's hypotheses of the origin of Christianity. Whether they 
can be established depend on several questions. The first is about the internal 
consistency of these hypotheses. As for this question, I find that Nietzsche can 
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smoothly explain the origin of Christian morality, guilt and its ascetic ideal and that 
there is no contradiction among the three hypotheses. The second question is about 
the evidences for the hypotheses. Nietzsche mainly uses historical, etymological and 
biblical evidence to support his hypotheses. One could challenge the historical 
accuracy of his evidence, his etymological analysis and his interpretation of the 
biblical text. Although this kind of inspection is worth taking, it would lead us too 
far afield. Instead, I am going to pursue the third kind of evaluation. This is about 
the accuracy of his characterization of Christianity. This is probably the most 
popular line of criticism of Nietzsche. Is Christian morality really based on 
ressentiment? Is Christian ethics really a form of asceticism? Does Christian ethics 
really prescribe the extirpation of natural instinct and passion? Many people hold 
negative answers to these questions and object that Nietzsche wrongly characterizes 
Christianity. I am going to examine the details of these criticisms in the follow. 
A. Christianity and Ressentiment 
The first challenge I am going to answer is about the relation of ressentiment 
and Christian ethics. Nietzsche does not only trace the origin of Christianity to the 
emotion of ressentiment, but also regard the Christian love as the most delicate 
flower of ressentiment. However, many people would object that the essence of 
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Christianity is love, which is in diametrical opposition to ressentiment. In his book 
Ressentiment, Max Scheler argues that while modern humanitarian morality has its 
roots in resentiment, Christian morality is free of ressentiment. In other words, he 
considers ‘his (Nietzsche's) theory to be completely mistaken，？）. In his view, a 
reversal of the movement of love can be discerned from the development of Greek 
conception of love to Christianity. While the conception of love in ancient Greek is 
an aspiration of lower toward the higher, the distinguishing character of Christian 
love is 'the nobler stoops to the vulgar, the healthy to the sick, the rich to the poor, 
the handsome to the ugly, the good and saintly to the bad and common, the Messiah 
to the sinners and p u b l i c a n s ' H o w e v e r , there are two distinct causes of the 
reversal of movement of love”，which Nietzsche fails to distinguish. 
The reversal of the moment of love 'can be motivated by a powerful feeling of 
security, strength, and inner salvation, of the invincible fullness of one's own life 
and existence，78. fullness of life engenders an urge to sacrifice and overcome 
the natural reaction of fear in sacrifice. In Scheler's view, it is the essence of love in 
Jesus's teaching, which is free of resentiment. For instance, when Jesus teaches us 
not to worry about eating and drinking (Luke 12:22), it represents an indifferent 
Max Scheler (1961), p. 84. 
76 Ibid, p. 86. 
77 丨bid, p. 88. 
Ibid, p. 88. 
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attitude to the external means of life and a profound confidence in life own vigor 
and inner security. 
The other kind of love originates from an urge to 'escape' and from 'the 
inability to remain at home with o n e s e l f 79. Love in this sense is inspired by 
self-hatred, by hatred of one's own weakness and misery. Afraid of seeing one's 
inferiority, one is driven to give oneself to the other. 'There is nothing but the urge 
to turn away from oneself and to lose oneself in other's people's business'^. There 
is a profound sense of hatred behind this kind of love. However, it has nothing to do 
with the Christian love. 
What can we say about Scheler's defense of Christianity? In my opinion, there 
are several difficulties in Scheler's defense. The first is the defectiveness in his 
discussion of the second motivation of love. If Scheler is right that the movement of 
Christian love is from the higher to the lower, from the noble to the common, how 
come that the higher and the noble one have that kind of self-hatred? Why don't 
they have a deep sense of superiority and self-confidence instead? 
Secondly, Scheler seems to have disregarded Nietzsche's evidence. Nietzsche 
has offered many textual evidences from the Bible and the writing of Christian 
theologists to support his claim that Christian love originate from ressentiment. For 
79 Ibid, p. 95. 
Ibid.p.95. 
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example, Nietzsche finds the passages of the Bible contains ressentiment: 'and 
whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear you, when ye depart thence, shake off the 
dust under your feet for a testimony against them. Verily I say unto you, it shall be 
more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city' 
(Mark 6:11)，'God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to ruin the wise; and 
God hath chosen the weak things of the world to ruin what is strong; And base 
things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and what 
is nothing, to bring to nought what is something: that no flesh should glory in his 
presence' (Paul, I Cor. 1:20)^'. 
He discerns ressentiment from Thomas Aquinas's saying 'The blessed in the 
kingdom of heaven will see the punishments of the damned, in order that their bliss 
be more delightful for them' and from Tertullian 'How vast a spectacle then bursts 
upon the eye! What there excites my admiration? What my derision? Which sight 
gives me joy? Which rouses me to exultation? - as I see so many illustrious 
monarch, whose reception into the heavens was publicly announced, groaning now 
in the lowest darkness... governors of province, too, who persecuted the Christian 
name, in fires more fierce than those with which in the days of their pride they raged 
against the followers of Chris t ’ 82. Unless these passages can be satisfactorily 
81 Many other citations can be found in A §45. 
See GM I§15. Aquinas's passage is quoted from Sum ma Theologiae III Supplementum, Q. 94, Art. 
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explained away, Nietzsche's hypothesis would stand. 
Finally, Scheler simply twists the meaning of the word 'ressentiment'. 
Ressentiment in Nietzsche's sense is not a form of self-hatred as Scheler thinks. 
Instead, it is a kind of hatred and urge to revenge against and become master over 
enemy. Nietzsche states explicitly that 'this inversion of the value-positing eye -
this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself — is of the essence 
of ressentiment: in order to exist, salve morality always first needs a hostile external 
world...action is fundamentally reaction' (GM I，§10;emphasis added). 
If we bear the meaning of ressentiment in mind, it is easy to see how there is 
the emotion of ressentiment hidden in the Christian love. Although it is true that the 
movement of Christian love is from the higher to the lower, Scheler fails to see that 
love is a moral demand and is advocated by the lower, the poor and the oppressed. 
In other words, it is a moral demand made by the lower class that the higher should 
bend for them. This point is bom out by the historical fact that Christianity 
originates from the lower class of Jewish society. And it is further supported by the 
fact that Christianity particularly palatable to the lower class. Nietzsche is saying 
that there is a hidden ressentiment in this moral demand of love. The lower class 
expresses their envy and hostility of the noble class in the name of love and 
1 while Tertullian's passage is quoted from De Spectacids Chapter 30. 
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equality. 
B. Christianity and Anti-Naturalness 
Nietzsche has charged that Christian ethics is anti-natural in the sense of 
prescribing extirpation of natural instinct and passion. People may charge that 
Nietzsche has exaggerated and misunderstood the character of Christian ethics. Take 
sexual instinct as an example, Christian church never forbids sexual intercourse but 
only to restricts it in monogamous marriage. 
To answer this criticism, it should be noticed that the natural instincts that 
Nietzsche has in mind is very broad indeed. It includes the instinct of cruelty, lust 
for power, revenge, and enmity. Nietzsche is arguing that these instincts could be 
sublimated and could have positive usages. On the contrary, it is hard to see how 
Christianity can tolerate these instincts. 
Secondly, Nietzsche may be using the word 'extirpation' in a looser sense. He 
may mean that Christianity see the natural instincts as intrinsically bad or worthless. 
Therefore, the ideal state is to get these instincts extirpated. But given the fmitude of 
human being, we should minimize them to the maximum extend. 
If this is what Nietzsche means by the word 'anti-natural', it is not hard to see 
how Christianity is necessarily anti-natural with the body-soul dichotomy and the 
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doctrine of sin. D. P. Verene has pointed out that the uniqueness of Christian ethics 
is that its rule is defined in terms of a theory of one's relationship to God and the 
no 
future of one's soul . To see human as having a soul is to locate the human nature 
in a spiritual substance, which is separate and distinct from the body. As God is a 
pure spiritual and immaterial, so as my soul. And to me, body is always 
imperfection and is trial on one's road of salvation^"^. Thus, the essence of ethical 
rule is to 'relate my body and my bodily activities in such a way as to attempt 
always to orient my soul toward God'. The resulted morality is necessarily 
oc 
'body-denying morality' . The more we are free from the bodily needs and the 
control of bodily instinct, the better we are in God's mind. 
Take the sexual rule as an instance. Christianity does not really hold a positive 
value to sexual activities, though it makes the concession that sexual intercourse is 
permitted in married couples. For example, sex is still regarded as both the symbol 
and cause of original sin in traditional Christian perspective. The sole purpose of 
sex that the church allows is for procreation. Virginity is still regarded as an 
important virtue. A more interesting point can be seen from Augustine's attitude on 
sex. Augustine is deeply worried by the problem of lust in sexual activities. On the 
83 See D. P. Verene (1995), p. 61. 
84 For example, it is said that 'For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I 
can will what is right, but I cannot do it，(Roman 7:18) 
Ibid. p.61. For example, it is said that 'Live by the Spirit, I say, and do not gratify the desires of 
the flesh. For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what the Spirit desires is opposed to 
the flesh' (Galatians 5:16-7) 
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one hand, we must have lust in order that we have motive for sex and male's sexual 
organ gets erected. On the other hand, he thinks lust is the stirrings of obscene heat 
under which we lose momentary mental control of ourselves. Therefore, Augustine 
thinks that true Christian would prefer to beget children without this kind of lust. In 
his mind, the ideal sexual activity would be conducted like a duty, without desire 
and pleasure86. 
C. Jesus and Paul 
Nietzsche has a very special understanding of Christianity. He thinks the 
original teaching of Jesus is falsified by Jesus' disciples, especially Paul. The slave 
revolt against the master begins with Jews and Paul is the first representative figure 
of the revolt. 
According to Nietzsche, the deep psychology of Jesus is the extreme capacity 
of suffering and excitement. This causes two instinctive reactions: 
(1) The instinctive hatred of reality, which no longer wants any contact 
with reality at all. 
(2) The instinctive exclusion of any antipathy, any hostility, any 
boundaries or divisions in man's feeling because he experiences any 
resistance too unpleasant. (A, §30) 
These two reactions constitute the basis and essence of Jesus' teachings. Under 
86 See City of God, Part II. 
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the influence of (2)，Jesus teaches love, in which there is no longer any opposition 
and struggle. The most prominent demonstration of Jesus' love is his own death. 
The significance of Jesus' death is not to redeem men from sin but to show how one 
must live: that is, not to resist, not to defend his right, but to provoke the worst (A, 
§35). 
Under the influence of (1)，Jesus turns to the inner world instead of the outer. 
His sole aim is to achieve inner peace of mind. The words which seem to refer to 
the other world are actually symbolic languages which refer to the state of mind. For 
example, ‘the kingdom of God’ is the peaceful state of heart; 'Father' is this 
peaceful feeling itself; 'Son' is the entry into the overall felling of transfiguration of 
all things (A, §34). Thus, in Nietzsche's mind, the good news brought by Jesus is a 
way of living which is attainable in our worldly live^^. 
Since Nietzsche takes the above as the essence of Jesus' teaching, he says 
'there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross' (A, §39) because 'the 
history of Christianity beginning with the death on the cross, is the history of the 
misunderstanding, growing cruder with every step, of an original symbolism' (A, 
§37)88 . 
87 Nietzsche says i t is not a "faith that distinguishes the Christian: the Christian acts, he is 
distinguished by acting differently: by not resisting, either in words or in his heart...' (A, §33) 
In his defense of Paul, Hans Kung says 'But it is quite wrong to depict Paul as the real founder of 
Christianity, as Nietzsche already did. For long before Paul's personal conversion there was a faith in 
Christ: in other words, Jewish followers of Jesus experienced the Crucified Jesus as the Messiah 
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Upon the death of Jesus, his disciples ask 'Who killed him? Who was his 
enemy?' and thereby retrospectively understand Jesus to have been in rebellion 
against the existing order. Under the feeling of revenge, they introduce the doctrine 
of retributive judgment and take the kingdom of God as a promise (A, §40). 
Moreover, they ask 'how could God permit this?' and thereby introduce the doctrine 
of sin, death as sacrificial death and resurrection (A, §41). 
Nietzsche takes Paul as ‘the genius of hatred' (A, §40) for he 'falsifies the 
history of Israel as the prehistory of Jesus' deed' and 'transposes the center of 
gravity of the whole existence after this existence'. 
Nietzsche's understanding of Jesus and Paul is surely extraordinary. The real 
question is: what is the basis or source of Nietzsche's understanding of the original 
teaching of Jesus? There are two points that we can assure. Firstly, his 
understanding of Jesus is not based on the historical fact about Jesus. He says 'the 
biographies of saints are the most ambiguous kind of literature there is: to apply 
scientific methods to them, in the absence of any other documents, strikes me as 
doomed to failure from the starte - mere scholarly idleness' (A, §28). That is to say, 
he knows that the historical data is too scarce for a reconstruction of the historical 
(Christ) now elevated to God. So Paul is not the responsible for the fundamental shift from Jesus' 
faith to the community's faith in Christ', Kung (1994)，p.20. 
However, Kung seems to have missed Nietzsche's point. Nietzsche is saying that Paul, being the 
first Christian theologian, completely falsifies the message of Jesus and thereby becomes the founder 
of Christianity as we now understand. 
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Jesus. 
Secondly, his understanding of Jesus seems to be drawn from some parts of the 
Gospels: 'What concerns me is the psychological type of the Redeemer. After all, 
this could be contained in the Gospels despite the Gospels, however mutilated or 
overloaded with alien features...Not the truth concerning what he did, what he said, 
how he really died; but the question whether his type can still be exhibited at all, 
whether it has been "transmitted"' (A, §29; emphasis added). Nietzsche seems to 
say that the psychology of the original Jesus can be contained in the Gospels 
although he latter tells us that the Gospels 'are valuable as testimony to the 
irresistible corruption within the first community' and ‘as artistry in psychological 
corruption' (A, §44). 
This invites question of the criterion of his selection from the Gospels. How 
does Nietzsche distinguish the parts of the Gospels that are the original teaching of 
Jesus from those that are falsified statement? 
I am fully aware of the difficulties in defending Nietzsche. Not being an expert 
of the Bible, I just want to suggest a possible way of defense. The case may be that 
there are two kinds of Jesus' teaching contained in the Bible. One is in the letters of 
Paul and most parts of the Gospel, which constitute the dominant image and 
teaching of Jesus. The Jesus in these writings emphasizes the sin, redemption, faith 
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and kingdom of God as a promise. But some passages in the Gospels may contain 
messages that are logically incompatible with the dominant one. For example, Jesus 
in Gospel says repeated that ‘Repent for the kingdom of God is near' (e.g. Matthew 
3:2; 4:16). In Luke, Jesus even says ‘the kingdom of God is not coming with things 
that can be observed; nor will they say, "Look, here it is!" or "There it is!" For, in 
fact, kingdom of God is within you' (Luke, 17:20-21). This is certainly 
incompatible with the dominant teaching where 'our citizenship is in heaven, and it 
is from there that we are expecting a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ’ (Philippians, 
3:20) and 'then the sign of the Son of Man will appear in heaven, and then all the 
tribes of the earth will mourn, and they will see "the Son of Man" coming on the 
clouds of heaven' with power and great glory' (Matthew 24:30). For the former 
refers to an inner state while the later literally refers to an heaven. 
Love and punishment are another incompatible teachings. Jesus who teaches 
'love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be 
children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the 
good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous' (Matthew, 5:44-45) is 
clearly contradictory with the one who teaches 'and whosoever shall not receive you, 
nor hear you, when ye depart thence, shake off the dust under your feet for a 
testimony against them. Verily I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom 
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and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city' (Mark 6:11). 
What I am suggesting is that Nietzsche may be arguing from the two 
incompatible teachings of Jesus to the conclusion that there is an original teaching 
of Jesus contained in the Gospels that are falsified by his disciples. Whether this 
way of defending can succeed depends on our interpretation of the Bible. Sincere 
Christians would certainly try to reconcile the seeming contradicting teachings of 
Jesus. However, if the reconciliation fails, then it would turn out that Nietzsche's 
hypothesis is more convincing. I would rather just leave this question open for the 
validity of Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity is not built upon this problematic 
position. 
6.2. On Nietzsche's Criticism of Christianity 
On the whole, I agree with many of Nietzsche's criticisms of Christianity. I 
share Nietzsche's view that the doctrine of sin brings us unnecessary suffering, that 
the ascetic ideal leads to nihilism and the Christian God are deity for decedent 
people. However, I am not sure whether Nietzsche's criticism of the Christian ethics 
can all be true. This is mainly because I find that many of his charge against the 
Christian ethics is based a problematic theory of the will to power. In what follows, 
I am going to explain the extent to which his criticism is based on the will to power 
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and then to spell out the difficulties of this theory. 
When Nietzsche criticizes the Christian ethics, he is implicitly using the will to 
power as the criterion of valuation. He argues that Christianity does not improve 
mankind because real improvement consists in the sublimation of the raw of form of 
power (i.e. passion and natural instincts). That is to say, a value system is valuable if 
it can enhance the sublimation of will to power. Moreover, Nietzsche criticizes that 
A 
the Christian value is hostile to life and decadent mainly because it hampers the 
growth of life, which is essentially the expansion of power. These criticisms are so 
connected with the theory of will to power that they stand and fall with the 
tenability of the theory. In the following section, I am going to explain one of the 
most popular interpretation of will to power and then argue that (1) the descriptive 
side of the will to power, at least on this reading, is either empty or false; (2) the use 
of will to power as a measure of value involves the naturalistic fallacy; and finally 
(3) the process of sublimation incurs the problem of the identity of an instinct. 
A. The Will to Power 
On one of the most popular reading of the theory of will to power, Nietzsche 
wants to use the theory both to explain the ultimate motivation of human behavior 
and to carry out the revaluate the popular value system, including Christianity. This 
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interpretation is probably first proposed by Walter Kaufmann and has now become a 
prevalent reading of the theory of will to power. In Kaufmannn's word, the theory of 
will to power is 'the basic force underlying all human activities'^^ and represents 
'Nietzsche's final theory of values' in which ‘the quantitative degree of power is the 
measure of value'^. 
Although Kuafmann's interpretation is well supported by Nietzsche's texts, the 
difficulties of this way of interpretation are not difficulty to see. Firstly, there is the 
problem of the emptiness in explaining every human behavior for the aim of 
maximization of power. Clark has bluntly points out that 'the enlightening character 
of explanations of behavior in terms of the desire for power is dependent on an 
implicit contrast with other motives, and is therefore lost as soon as all other 
motives are interpreted as expressions of the will to power'^'. That is to say, if the 
explanation of human behavior in terms of will to power is to be become 
meaningful, there must be some activities that are done for different motivations. If 
all activities are said to be done out of the motive of power, the meaning of 'power' 
would become so board that it becomes a mere phrase and the explanation would 
thereby become empty. However, if there are some deep motives that are distinct 
from will to power, the theory that the will to power is the ultimate human 
89 Kaufmann (1974), p. 193 
90 Ibid. P.200. 
91 Clark (1990)，P.210. 
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motivation is false. Thus this explanatory side of the will to power faces the 
dilemma that it is either empty in meaning or it is false. 
Secondly, there is a gap between the descriptive side and the prescriptive side 
of the theory. Since Hume, it is well known that ‘ought’ cannot be derived from ‘is， 
and that anyone who do so commits the naturalistic fallacy^^. However, this is 
exactly what Nietzsche wants to do in Kaufmann's interpretation. Leiter has 
analyzed the difficulty of bridging the gap from 'is' to 'ought'. He thinks that the 
kind of reasoning resembles John Stuart Mill's well-known and oft-criticized proof 
of the principle of utility: 
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that 
people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people 
hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In the like manner, I 
apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is 
desirable is that people desire it^ .^ 
Therefore, defender of Nietzsche can argue that to show that power is desirable 
is to show that power is desired. The difficulty of this argument is that it only shows 
that power is desirable and valuable for the person who desires it. But it fails to 
92 Naturalistic fallacy is originally a term coined by G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica. He argues 
ethical term is indefinable for no matter definition is proposed, we can always sensibly ask 'But is 
that good?' The conclusion is that ethical term is undefinable and any attempt to define ethical term 
by naturalistic term commits the naturalistic fallacy. 
However, scholars also calls the attempt to derive 'ought' from ‘is’，a gap which is first discovered 
by David Hume, as naturalistic fallacy. For example, see John Searle, in his 'How to Derive "ought" 
from "is", collected in Foot (1990). 
93 Quoted from Lieter, ibid. p. 282. 
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establish that power 'ought to be desired' and is 'objectively d e s i r a b l e , 9 4 . 
Another variant of the Millian argument to defense Nietzsche is to argue that 
something cannot be valuable for a person unless the person is capable of caring 
about (or desiring) it. If power is the only thing that is and can be desired, it is 
objectively valuable. This seems to be the argument by Ivan So lP . While this 
argument succeeds in bridging 'ought' from ‘is，，its credibility depends on the 
strong thesis that power is the only thing that can be desire. This thesis is clearly 
connected with difficulty of the explanation side of the will to power that we have 
mentioned. 
If Kaufmann's interpretation has so many fatal difficulties, why do scholars 
still cling to it? The reason, I guess, is that there lack a better alternative 
interpretation. If it is the case, it is fair to say that Nietzsche's criticism of the 
Christian ethics remains problematic unless we have a better way of rendering his 
theory of the will to power. 
B. The Sublimation of Will to Power 
When Nietzsche criticizes Christian ethics of being anti-natural, he is thinking 
Leiter (2000), p.283. 
95 Ivan Soil says 'with respect to what is proposed as the one universal, ultimate, and necessary goal 
of all desiring (pleasure and the absence of pain in Mill's utilitarianism, power in Nietzsche's 
philosophy, we cannot, in the same sense, want something other than we should want'. See his paper 
'Nietzsche on Cruelty, Asceticism, and the Failure of Hedonism，，collected in Richard Schacht ed. 
(1994). 
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that natural instincts and passion can be sublimated and thereby become creative 
force of culture. Take cruelty as an example. Nietzsche says that 'everything we call 
"higher culture" is based on the spiritualization of cruelty, on its becoming more 
profound: this is my proposition' (BGE §229). What he has in mind is that the 
instinct of cruelty can be directly expressed as hurting others and oneself. However, 
it can also have spiritualized expressions, such as the self-mastery and the will to 
surpass others in the intellectual, artistic and other areas. 
There is a problem of the identity of the natural instinct in the process of 
sublimation. How do we know that the spiritualized expression is the expression of 
the same instinct? As an interpreter who is sensitive to the element of sublimation in 
Nietzsche's writing, Kaufmann is fully aware of the problem: 'if a man does one 
thing instead of another, a substitution takes place and the original impulse is 
cancelled or subdued, but not sublimated'^^. His answer is that the kind of criticism 
wrongly takes that the objective defines the very essence of an impulse. But in 
Kaufmann's view, ‘he (Nietzsche) considers the will to power, which remains 
throughout, the "essence", while all ends, objective and the like, are merely 
accidental and changing attributes...of the will to power'^^. That is to say, the 
essence of sexual impulse is the will to power (i.e. feeling and increase of power), 
96 Kaufmann, (1974), p.221. 
97 Ibid, p.221. I 
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but not the immediate aim of sexual intercourse. Thus, in the process of sublimation, 
while the immediate objective is cancelled, the essential objective (i.e. the increase 
of power) is preserved and achieved for there is more place for rationality in the 
sublimated expressions. 
The problem in Kaufmann's answer is that there is no way of differentiating of 
different kind of impulses if their essences are all conceived as the urge to attain 
more power. In philosophy, essence means the defining feature of one thing^^To say 
that the essence of man is rationality is to say that rationality is what distinguishes 
man from other beings. This definition implies either that we cannot distinguish 
different kinds of instinct for they have the same essence or that we can distinguish 
different kinds of instinct, not through the will to power as Kaufmann's position 
implies, but through their corresponding immediate objective. In my view, the later 
is more likely to be the case. For example, to know that I have sexual desire is to 
know that I want to have sex with others while to have the instinct of cruelty is to 
want to inflict unpleasant feeling on others. Thus, the immediate objective of an 
impulse is not as 'accidental' to the essence of an impulse as Kaufmann conceives 
and his solution would incur the risk of blurring the difference of different instincts. 
98 A more strict formulation is: 'x is essentially F if and only if necessarily whatever is x has the 
property of F; equivalently, x must be F to exist at all'. See the entry o f Essentialism' in Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig ed. (Routledge, 1998). 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Dionysus versus the Crucified 
In my view, the best way to conclude the thesis is to offer an exposition of 
Nietzsche's last saying in his autobiography: 'Have I been understood? - Dionysus 
versus the Crucified. - ’ (EH IV, §9)99，which is also born in the title of this thesis. 
That 'the Crucified' signifies Christianity is beyond doubt. But what does 
'Dionysus' mean? And what does Dionysus oppose in Christianity? Interestingly, an 
informative answer is to be found on the new preface of The Birth of Tragedy, 
which is added in 1886: 
It was against morality that my instinct turned with this questionable book 
[i.e. BT], long ago: it was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that 
discovered for itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and valuation of 
life - purely artistic and anti-Christian. What to call it? As a philologist 
and man of words I baptized it...in the name of Greek god: I called it 
Dionysian. (BT, 'Attempt At a Self-Criticism', §5; emphasis added) 
That is to say, the opposition of Dionysus and the Crucified amounts to the 
opposition of artistic and naturalist (implied by the use of 'life') worldview with that 
of the Christian and moral interpretation. What is repugnant in the Christian-moral 
interpretation of the world is its hostility to life: 
99 In Kaufmann's interpretation, the Dionysus in Nietzsche's latter writing is no longer that of The 
Birth of Tragedy because the opposition of the two gods is repudiated in the latter writings and 
Dionysian becomes ‘a creative striving that gives form to i tself . See Kaufmann (1974), p.282. 
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Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's 
nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed 
up as, faith in "another" or better "life". Hatred of "the world", 
condemnations of the passions, fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond 
invented the better to slander this life, at bottom a craving for the nothing, 
for the end for respite, for "the sabbath of sabbaths" - all this struck 
me...at the very least a sing of abysmal sickness, weariness, 
discouragement, exhaustion, and the impoverishment of life. (Ibid, §5) 
This charge against Christianity echoes the last few paragraphs of The 
Anti-Christ where Nietzsche presents his criticism like a decree posed on the 
w a U _ : 
This eternal indictment of Christianity I will write on all walls, wherever 
there are walls — I have letters to make even the blind see. 
I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, 
the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means is poisonous, 
stealthy, subterranean, small enough - 1 call it the one immortal blemish of 
mankind. (A, §62) 
For Nietzsche, Christianity is basically a life-denying religion. Under 
Christianity, the animal nature of human being is interpreted as sin, the natural 
instinct is extirpated through its anti-natural rules, the worth of human being is 
denied with the invention of the holy God, and finally the meaning of our live is 
directed to the beyond. In sum, the intrinsic value of life and nature are totally 
denied. This explains why Nietzsche says that Christianity is a 'curse', 'an immortal 
10° According to Gary Shapiro, Nietzsche actually added a short section entitled 'Decree Against 
Christianity' after completing the manuscript. But this short section is removed by his executors. For 
the content of this decree, see Gary Shapiro ‘The Antichrist and the Semiotics of History', collected 
in Solomon (1988), pp. 212-213. 
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blemish of mankind' and 'the slander of nature'. In the previous chapters, I hope I 
have successfully reconstructed Nietzsche's criticism into sensible criticisms that 
admit rational appraisal. 
In contrast, Nietzsche preaches the Dionysian worldview, which is affirmative 
to life and nature and artistic in character. Its guiding idea is to give up the 
estimation of the worth of nature with the pre-established scheme, especially the 
moral one, for 'confronted with morality, life must be continually and inevitably be 
in the wrong, because life is something essentially amoral - and eventually, crushed 
by the weight of contempt and eternal No, life must then be felt to be unworthy of 
desire and altogether worthless' (Ibid, §5)'^'. 
Instead, we should (1) accept life and nature as it is (as Nietzsche says 
Dionysus is the redemption of ‘the contradictions and questionable aspects of 
existence' and is 'the religious affirmation of life, life whole and not denied or in 
part’ (WP, §1052)) and (2) strive for its perfection like an artist (as he says 'I too 
speak of a "return to the nature", although it is really not a going back but an 
ascent... ' (TIIX， 
More concretely, Nietzsche teaches sublimation and making creative uses of 
natural instincts: 'Man, in his highest and most noble capacities, is wholly nature 
Cf. TI VII §8 where Nietzsche discusses the restoration of the innocent of becoming. 
‘ C f . U II §3 for Nietzsche's discussion of ' the transfigured physis, and U II §10 for to 'organize 
the chaos'. 
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and embodies its uncanny dual character. Those of his abilities which are awesome 
and considered inhuman are perhaps the fertile soil out of which alone all 
humanity ...can grow.'®^' For the natural hardship, Nietzsche teaches its positive 
value of suffering in the process of self-perfection 
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering - do you not know that 
only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That 
tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its 
shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness, and courage in 
enduring, preserving, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and 
whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit， 
cunning, greatness - was it not granted to it through suffering, through 
the discipline of great suffering? (BGE, §225) 
The above description of Dionysus'®^ naturally reminds us Nietzsche's image 
of philosopher of the f u t u r e w h o s e most important task is: 
Is this even possible today? — But some day, in a stronger age than this 
decaying, self-doubting present, he must yet come to us, the redeeming 
man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit ... when he one day 
emerges again into the light, he may bring home the redemption of this 
reality: is redemption form the curse that hitherto reigning ideal had laid 
upon it. This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the 
hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out 
of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke 
of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will again and 
restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this Antichrist and 
antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness — he must come one 
d a y . - ( G M II, §24) 
Cited from Homer's Contest, collected in The Portable Nietzsche. 
104 Nehamas has a valuable discussion of how we can transform the significance of hardship that 
happens to us by existentially creating our future. See Nehamas (1985), Chapter 5. Cf. TI XI’ §4. 
I仍 Thus interpreted, it is sensible for Nietzsche to say that ‘The Birth of Tragedy was my first 
revaluation of all value' (TI XI, §5). 
i�6 Nietzsche also calls this new philosopher as ‘the free spirit'. See BGE § 42-44. 
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The new philosopher is to redeem mankind from the curse of Christianity on 
the one hand and from the impending nihilism on the other. Although Nietzsche 
says he is only a 'herald and precursor' of the new philosopher (BGE §44), his 
whole career can be said as an attempt to carry out the task of the new philosopher. 
In the proceeding chapters, I have shown how he tries to show us the nihilistic 
effects of Christianity and slightly touched on his construction of a value-system 
upon naturalistic worldview. Though I have pointed out some difficulties of his 
theory of the will to power, I must say I appreciate his effort very much. 
7.2 What Christian and Non-Christian Can Learn from 
N i e t z s c h e ^ ® ^ 
After (or even before) reading this thesis, one may wonder its significance. 
Apart from furthering our understanding of Nietzsche, what else can it achieve? 
After all, sincere Christians would not give up their faith and would probably 
consider Nietzsche's criticism as totally misunderstanding and thus being irrelevant. 
That the majority of Christian would not take his criticism seriously is 
� 7 This heading is borrowed from Hans Kung, 'Nietzsche: What Christian and Non-Christian Can 
Leam?', collected in O'Flaherty, Sellner and Helm (1985). Kung thinks that for the non-Christian, 
Nietzsche shows us that 'for just as the weakling type of Christian provenance — as Nietzsche saw 
him - cannot be, may not be, the model for being truly human, neither can the superman, of secular 
provenance' p. 348. Kung has attributed the value vacuum and the rise of Nazism to the idea of 
superman, which seems to be have misunderstood Nietzsche. 
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anticipated by Nietzsche himself. In the preface of The Anti-Christ, he says that ‘this 
book belongs to the very few. Perhaps not one of them is even living yet'. The 
reason for this is probably that 'all the world still believes in the writings of the 
"Holy Spirit", or stands in the after-effect of this belief: when one opens the Bible 
one does so to "edify" oneself, to discover a signpost of consolation in one's own 
personal distress....' (D, §68). The result of the belief that the messages in the Bible 
are words of God is that we take them as unconditional truth and dare not to 
question. However, Nietzsche reminds us ‘all this means that the foundation of 
belief and all reflection on its origin is likewise excluded as sinful. What is wanted 
are blindness and intoxication and an eternal song over the waves in which reason 
has drowned!' (D, §89)'^^ To those stubborn Christians, if there is any, Nietzsche's 
criticism certainly could not have any relevance. 
However，for those who share Nietzsche's belief that ‘at every step one has to 
wrestle for truth' and to 'make every Yes and No a matter of conscience' (A, §50)^®^ 
the questions Nietzsche raises are surely very challenging and worth considering. 
Firstly, Nietzsche offers an internal criticism. For example, Nietzsche's genealogy 
discovers that Christianity contains element of ressentiment. If Nietzsche is right, 
the very values that Christianity espouses compel us to ask whether some doctrines 
108 Cf. A, §54-55 where conviction is said to be born out of weakness of heart. 
109 This may be why Nietzsche says 'the most serious Christians have always been well disposed 
toward me' (EH, I’ §7). 
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should be abandoned, or whether the whole system should be self-overcome and 
also whether we become a Christian out of ressentiment. 
Secondly, Nietzsche's view that Jesus' message is totally falsified by Paul， 
strange as it may be, compels us to reconsider what does it mean to be a Christian. 
Is it faith that matters or the actual practice of everyday that matters? For this point, 
I would like to quote Nietzsche's question for the self-reflection on the part of 
Christians today: 'Where has the last feeling of decency and self-respect gone when 
even our statesmen, an otherwise quite unembarrassed type of man, anti-Christians 
through and through in their deeds, still call themselves Christians today and attend 
communion?' (A, §38) 
Thirdly, differing from the common challenge against Christianity (e.g. to 
question the existence of God), Nietzsche shifts the emphasis to the worth of its 
value system. No matter his criticism succeeds or not"^, the questions he poses are 
both radical and important. It seems to me that only a few thinkers before Nietzsche 
has asked the worth of equality, pity and altruism on the one hand and the universal 
character of morality on the other. The result is that different philosophers take these 
value and presupposition (e.g. while the utilitarian takes the former set and Kant 
Although I have pointed out the difficulties of the theory of will to power, I personally believe 
that many insights are contained in his criticism of Christian ethics. The problem is just how we can 
free these criticisms from the difficulties in the theory of will to power or have a better interpretation 
of the will to power. I am so regret that I have no time to try either way of defending Nietzsche. 
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takes the latter) as the starting point of their ethical systems. However, the validity 
of the presupposition should be questioned first. This is exactly the insight of 
Nietzsche for both Christian and non-Christian. 
Besides, for the non-Christian, Nietzsche's genealogy demonstrates a valuable 
way of doing philosophy. For Nietzsche, ' ...lack of historical sense is the family 
failing of all philosophers' and the danger is that 'many, without being aware of it, 
even take the most recent manifestation...as the fixed form from which one has to 
start out，(HA, §2) '" . In comparison with the transcendental method in Kant's 
philosophy and linguistic analysis in Anglo-America, genealogy has a 
recommendable merit in that it takes the different manifestations of a subject matter 
in different periods of time and their historical evolution into consideration. 
7.3 Limitations of the Thesis 
Before ending this thesis, I must admit that this thesis has two limitations. The 
first is about the constructive side of Nietzsche's philosophy. Throughout the thesis, 
I have put overwhelming emphasis on his critique of Christianity and slightly 
touched on the idea of overman and eternal recurrence. This may give a false 
impression that Nietzsche is only destructive. While I believe that Nietzsche has 
Cf. BGE §186-7; TI IV. 
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proposed an alternative worldview and value system to Christianity in his writings, 
my reason for skipping them is that I cannot afford the required lengthy exposition 
in this thesis. As far as I know, no single doctrine of Nietzsche's constructive 
philosophy can easily be explained and scholars have comparatively fewer 
consensuses on what these doctrines actually mean. 
The second limitation is caused by the first one. Without a detailed exposition 
of Nietzsche's positive philosophy, we cannot determine to what extent Christianity 
is preserved in Nietzsche's thought. Scholars have come to realize that Nietzsche is 
not a total atheist for he incorporates some religious elements (e.g. asceticism, 
mysticism) in his philosophy''^. If this is the case, it seems justified to ask: Does 
Nietzsche totally reject Christianity? Does Nietzsche find any positive uses of 
Christianity? Or, at least, is there any affinity between Nietzsche's positive 
philosophy and Christianity? These are interesting questions. I only wish I could 
have opportunities to deal with them in other occasion. 
" “ T h i s seems to be a recent trend of Nietzsche's study. As far as I know, the most detailed 
discussion of this topic is offered by Tyler Roberts in Roberts (1998). Also Lippitt and Urpeth (2000) 
and Stuhr (2001) are two important anthologies. 
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